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Introduction1
On	New	Year’s	Eve	2016,	the	Cologne	Police	Department	proudly	re-
ported	via	Twitter	that	it	was	currently	screening	hundreds	of	“nafris”	
at	the	main	train	station	in	Cologne.2	The	label	‘nafri’,	used	by	the	po-
lice	to	refer	to	North	Africans,	had	its	(public)	linguistic	debut	in	this	
tweet,	 which	 was	 immediately	 followed	 by	 national	 moral	 outrage.	
Later,	when	 justifying	 the	 department’s	 choice	 of	words,	 the	 police	
chief	claimed	that	“[i]t	is	undeniable	that	there	is	an	accumulation	of	
criminal	acts	by	persons	from	North	African	areas,	and	we	needed	to	
find	a	police-internal	 term	 for	 that”.3	 So	what	were	people	 so	upset	
about?	The	police	department	introduced	a	term	that	functions	to	con-
vey	a	causal	link	between	membership	in	the	social	category	of	North	
Africans	and	criminal	behavior.	In	other	words,	they	introduced	a	term	
that	negatively essentialized	its	targets:	It	doesn’t	only	attribute	criminal	
behavior	to	the	group,	it	also	says	that	members	of	the	group	have	this	
trait	in virtue of some North-African “nature”. It	is	as	if	‘nafri’	says:	“there 
is something about North-Africans	that	makes	them	criminal”.	This,	as	
I	will	here	argue,	is	the	key	semantic	characteristic	of	slurs.	As	I	see	it,	
1.	 Special	 thanks	to	Robin	Jeshion,	Mark	Schroeder,	and	Guillermo	Del	Pinal	
for	various	rounds	of	comments	on	earlier	drafts	of	the	paper	and	extremely	
helpful	conversations	on	its	topic.	Thanks	also	to	Gretchen	Ellefson,	Jennifer	
Foster,	 Paul	 Garofalo,	 John	 Hawthorne,	 Frank	 Hong,	 Caley	 Howland,	
Gabbrielle	M.	Johnson,	Zoë	Johnson	King,	Renee	Jorgensen	Bolinger,	Brian	
H.	Kim,	 Junhyo	Lee,	Ben	Lennertz,	Alex	Mavda,	Rachel	McKinney,	Daniel	
Pallies,	 Quyen	 Pham,	 Jack	 Samuel,	 Henry	 Schiller,	 Scott	 Soames,	 David	
Wallace	and	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	very	helpful	comments	on	earlier	
versions	of	 the	paper.	 I	 presented	 versions	of	 this	 paper	 at	USC,	Cal	 Poly	
Pomona,	the	University	of	Michigan,	the	ECAP.9	in	Munich,	the	2017	Pacific	
APA	meeting,	the	2017	ESPP	meeting,	the	2017	SPP	meeting,	the	Athena	in	
Action	2018,	and	the	GAP.10	in	Cologne.	I	am	grateful	to	those	audiences	for	
helpful	discussions.
2.	 The	 original	 German	 tweet	 reads:	 “#PolizeiNRW	 #Silvester2016	 #Sicher-
InKöln:	 Am	HBF	werden	 derzeit	mehrere	Hundert	Nafris	 überprüft.	 Infos	
folgen”.	 Cf.	 http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/silvester-kontrollen-in-
koeln-was-bitteschoen-ist-ein-nafri-a-1128172.html,	downloaded	01.01.2017.
3.	 German	 original:	 “Eine	 Häufung	 an	 Straftaten	 von	 Personen	 aus	 dem	
nordafrikanischen	Raum	 lasse	 sich	aber	nicht	bestreiten,	und	dafür	müsse	
dann	 polizeiintern	 auch	 ein	 Begriff	 gefunden	 werden”	 (http://www.zeit.
de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-01/koeln-silvesternacht-polizei-nafri-
tweet-racial-profiling,	downloaded	01.01.2017).
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lexical	entry	of	kind	terms,	I	am	committed	to	a	conception	of	lexical	
representations	as	informationally	rich.	However,	instead	of	using	this	
paper	 to	debate	 foundational	 issues	 in	 lexical	 semantics,	 I	will	here	
simply	assume	this	framework	and	show	what	some	of	its	fruits	are.5 
I	begin	by	giving	a	detailed	outline	of	my	theory.	Next,	I	introduce	
key	linguistic	desiderata	of	a	theory	of	the	meaning	of	slurs,	and	show	
that	my	theory	meets	all	of	them.	Finally,	I	present	evidence	from	cog-
nitive	psychology	and	psycholinguistics	for	my	essentialist	account.	
§1 Slurs as Failed Kind Terms
1.1 The View
The	main	thesis	of	this	paper	is	that	slurs	are	akin	to	natural	kind	terms.	
Under	the	framework	of	natural	kind	terms	that	I	am	assuming,	natu-
ral	kind	terms	are	introduced	to	designate	an	essence	that	is	explana-
torily	connected	to	a	set	of	stereotypical	features	of	a	kind.	Slur	terms	
are	distinctive	because	they	designate6	an	essence	that	is	explanatorily	
connected	to	a	set	of	negative	stereotypical	features	of	a	social	group.	
Thus,	slurs	are	a	species	of	kind	terms	and	to	be	 treated	semantical-
ly	on	a	par	with	 terms	such	as	 ‘water’,	 ‘gold’,	or	 ‘tiger’.	Scott	Soames	
(2007)	describes	natural	kind	terms	such	as	‘water’	as	introduced	by	
the	following	schema:
The	term	‘water’	is	to	designate	the	unique	substance	of	
which	 (nearly)	 all	 members	 of	 the	 class	 of	 its	 paradig-
matic	samples	are	instances.	Substances	are	explanatory	
kinds	 instances	of	which	 share	 the	 same	basic	physical	
5.	 In	fact,	my	results	will	be	the	same	under	a	framework	of	natural	kind	terms	
according	to	which	they	rigidly	designate	an	essence	and	do	not	encode	any	
stereotypical	features.	Since	these	are	used	to	descriptively	fix	the	reference	
upon	 introduction	 of	 the	 kind	 term,	 the	 reference	 of	 slur	 terms	 will	 still	
be	empty,	but	 the	alleged	referents	will	 still	be	presupposed	 to	possess	an	
“essence”	with	negative	causal-dispositional	potential.	
6.	 Throughout	the	paper,	I	do not use	‘designate’,	‘refer’,	and	cognate	expressions	
as	 success	 terms.	As	 has	 already	 become	 clear,	 the	 view	 defended	 in	 this	
paper	is	that	slurs	have	null-extension,	and	thus	do	not	designate	or	refer	to	
anything.
slurs	are	kind	terms	encoding	an	“essence”	of	a	social	group,	which	is	
taken	to	explain	a	number	of	negative	features	attributed	to	the	group.	
In	effect,	then,	the	police	department	introduced	a	slur	for	people	from	
North	African	 countries	 into	 the	German	 language	 community,	 and	
people	were	rightly	upset	about	it.
The	main	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	introduce	to	the	philosophical	de-
bate	an	essentialist	theory	of	slurs	that	has,	to	my	knowledge,	not	yet	
been	given	adequate	consideration.	The	main	thesis	of	 this	paper	 is	
that	slurs4	are	a	species	of	 failed kind terms;	 they	are	 terms	which,	al-
though	introduced	with	the	intention	of	designating	kinds,	fail	to	do	
so.	All	 recognized	properties	of	 slurs	are	derivable	 from	this	 simple	
semantic	base;	no	additional	linguistic	entities	need	to	be	posited	to	
account	for	the	special	features	of	slurring	vocabulary.	Although	the	
primary	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	motivate	an	essentialist	semantics	of	
slurs	rather	than	to	defeat	theoretical	alternatives,	it	is	worth	mention-
ing	that	I	take	my	essentialist	model	to	have	a	central	virtue	that	makes	
it	stand	out	from	competing	theories.	Namely,	that	it	can	account	for	
the	acknowledged	desiderata	of	an	adequate	semantics	of	slurs	while	
receiving	strong	support	from	empirical	work	in	cognitive	psychology.	
In	what	follows,	I	assume	a	theory	of	natural	kind	terms	according	
to	which	they	encode	an	essence	of	a	kind,	k,	that	is	explanatorily	con-
nected	to	a	set	of	stereotypical	features	associated	with	k.	This	way	of	
carving	out	 the	semantics	of	natural	kind	terms	differs	slightly	 from	
the	classical	Kripkean	framework	of	natural	kind	terms.	Since	 I	 take	
descriptive	information	about	stereotypical	features	to	be	part	of	the	
4.	 One	question	that	has	come	up	in	the	literature	on	slurs	is	how	to	delineate	
the	 class	 of	 slurs,	 and,	 relatedly,	 how	 to	 distinguish	 slurs	 from	other	 pejo-
ratives	(see,	e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bach,	2018;	Croom,	2011;	 Jesh-
ion,	2013a;	Popa-Wyatt,	2016).	My	answer	to	this	question	has	direct	conse-
quences	 for	 the	 scope	of	my	 theory.	Although	 I	agree	with	other	 theorists	
that	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	paradigmatic	slurs	and	paradigmatic 
non-slurring	pejoratives	(e.g.,	so-called	“individual	pejoratives”	like	‘jerk’	or	
‘asshole’),	I	disagree	with	them	by	holding	that	these	two	classes	lie	on	a	con-
tinuum	rather	than	being	clearly	definable.	Correspondingly,	the	boundary	of	
the	scope	of	my	theory	is	fuzzy.	In	the	section	on	derogatory	variation,	I	will	
show	how	the	mechanics	of	my	model	explain	why	there	are	middle	cases	
that	are	not	clearly	classifiable	into	either	category.	
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G	—	whatever that	essence	is	—	which	is	causally	responsible	for	stereo-
typical	negative	features	associated	with	G	and	predicted	of	P. 
Importantly,	the	claim	is	not	that	there	are essences	of	the	kind	men-
tioned.	Although	slurs	are	introduced	with	the	intention	of	designating	
natural	kinds,	in	most	cases,	they	actually	fail	to	do	so.	In	contrast	to	
‘water’,	 ‘gold’	or	‘tiger’,	there	obviously	will	be	no	underlying,	unified	
causal	explanation	 for	 the	 set	of	 (often	 inaccurate)	 stereotypical	 fea-
tures	that	is	supposed	to	be	explained	by	the	essence	(see	also	Appiah,	
1985;	1996;	Zack,	2002).	More	concretely,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	
“gayness	essence”	which	disposes	male	homosexuals	to	carry	HIV	or	
dress	stylishly.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	a	“blackness	essence”	which	
causes	black	people	to	deal	drugs	or	receive	welfare.	Thus,	the	seman-
tic	contents	of	slurring	words	are	empty.
I	will	now	break	down	the	structure	of	slur	concepts	into	three	core	
elements	that,	according	to	the	view	I	am	advocating	here,	 together	
constitute	 a	 theory-like	 representation	 encoded	 in	 those	 concepts.8 
The	central	 element	of	 a	 slur	 is	 the	 causal	 component:	 the	 intrinsic	
“hidden	unobservable”	 that	explains	and	gives	rise	 to	 the	superficial,	
stereotypically	observable	features	and	actions	of	members	of	the	so-
cial	category	in	question.	It	is	this	causally	deep	component	that	we	
call	the	“essence”.	These	“essences”	are	to	be	thought	of	as	the	intrinsic,	
“underlying	natures	 that	make	 them	the	 thing	 that	 they	are”	 (Medin,	
1989,	p.	1476),	or	as	an	object’s	“underlying	reality	or	true	nature	that	
one	cannot	observe	directly	but	that	gives	an	object	its	identity,	and	is	
responsible	for	other	similarities	that	category	members	share”	(Gel-
man,	2004,	p. 404).	 Importantly,	 the	essence	can,	but	does	not	have	
to	be,	represented	as	being	biologically	grounded.	In	fact,	it	does	not	
have	 to	 be	 known	what	 exactly	 the	 essence	 is. Rather,	 essentialism	
can	be	 thought	of	 as	 “a	 ‘placeholder’	notion:	one	can	believe	 that	a	
8.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 paper,	 I	 often	 use	 the	 terms	 ‘term’	 and	 ‘concept’	
interchangeably.	This	is	because	I	take	the	view	for	granted	according	to	which	
terms	 inherit	 their	 linguistic	meaning	directly	 from	 internally	 individuated	
lexical	concepts,	which	I	understand	as	the	smallest	constituents	of	thought	
and	primary	bearers	of	meaning.
constitution,	 which	 in	 turn	 explains	 their	 most	 salient	
characteristics	—	in	 the	 case	 of	 water	 samples,	 the	 fact	
that	 they	 boil	 and	 freeze	 at	 certain	 temperatures,	 that	
they	are	clear,	potable,	and	necessary	to	life,	etc.	Hence,	
the	predicate	‘is	water’	will	apply	(at	a	world-state)	to	pre-
cisely	those	quantities	that	have	the	physical	constitution	
which,	at	the	actual	world-state,	explains	the	salient	fea-
tures	of	(nearly)	all	paradigmatic	water-samples.	(Soames,	
2007,	p.	2)
‘Water’	 hence,	 designates	 whatever underlying	 physical	 characteris-
tic	—	call	 it	 “essence”	—	is	 shared	by	all	 ‘water’-members	and	explains	
and	gives	rise	to	the	paradigmatic	features	of	water.	Similarly,	I	main-
tain	that	the	N-word	is	used	to	designate	a	“blackness	essence”	—	what-
ever	that	is	—	which	is	causally	responsible	for	and	explains	negative	
features	stereotypically	associated	with	being	black.	‘Faggot’	is	true	of	
those	people	who	share	the	“gay	essence”	—	whatever	that	is	—	which	
is	causally	responsible	for	and	explains	stereotypical	negative	features	
associated	with	gay	persons.7	 In	general,	 slur	concepts	encode	mini-
theories	which	represent	an	essence-like	element	that	is	causally	con-
nected	to	a	set	of	negatively-valenced	stereotypical	features	associated	
with	a	social	group.	The	truth-conditional	contribution	of	slur	nouns	
can	then	be	captured	by	the	following	schema:	For	a	given	slur	S	of	a	
social	group	G	and	a	person	P,	S	is	true	of	P	iff	P	bears	the	“essence”	of	
7.	 After	the	term	has	been	introduced	into	a	language	community,	it	is	possible	
that	 some	 stereotypes	 associated	 with	 a	 slur	 change.	 For	 example,	 at	 the	
time	of	introduction	of	‘faggot’,	the	“gayness	essence”	wasn’t	taken	to	explain	
the	feature	of	carrying	HIV,	a	negative	stereotypical	feature	now	associated	
with	 the	 slur,	 since	 the	 slur	 predates	 the	 discovery	 of	 the	 virus.	 In	 these	
cases,	we	simply	discover	more features	to	be	caused	by	the	essence	(just	as	
with	other	natural	kind	terms),	and	update	the	concept	accordingly.	Insofar	
as	the	updated	concept	 is	sufficiently	similar,	concept	 identity	 is	preserved	
(see	section	1.3).	Note,	however,	that	the	focus	of	this	paper	is	on	lexical,	not	
diachronic,	 semantics.	Diachronic	 phenomena,	 such	 as	 acquisition,	 lexical	
transition	from	non-slurring	to	slurring	meaning,	meaning	identity	over	time,	
or	appropriation	have	to	be	addressed	in	a	separate	paper.
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essentialized	group	share	one	or	another	subset	of	those	features.	But	
what’s	decisive for	belonging	to	the	essentialized	group	is	the	presence	
of	 the	 shared	 underlying	 “essence”	 or	 “hidden	 nature”.	 This	 nature	
causally	disposes	the	subject	to	exhibit	the	negative	surface	features,	
whether	or	not	they	actually	display	them	at	any	given	moment.	
As	the	first	and	second	component	don’t	stand	in	an	accidental,	but	
in	a	causal-nomological	 relation	 to	one	another,	we	need	a	 third	se-
mantic	component	to	capture	this	special	relation.	This	element	is	a	
representation	of	this	very	causal,	law-like	relationship.	This	relation-
ship	is	crucial	for	the	informational	organization	of	the	category	that	is	
represented	in	our	concept,	since	it	relates	the	essence	and	the	stereo-
typical	features	of	the	social	reference	group	in	a	way	that	is	not	merely	
arbitrary	or	correlational,	but	grounded	in	causal	laws.	
The	 immensely	 derogatory,	 toxic	 power	 of	 slur	 terms	 and	 their	
distinctively	racist (or	xenophobic,	homophobic,	sexist,	etc.)	content	
directly	derives	 from	 the	outlined	semantics.	When	 the	 racist,	 xeno-
phobe,	or	homophobe	applies	a	slur,	he	thereby	makes	the	target	in	
question	—	and anyone who “shares the same essence”	—	part	of	the	mini-
theory,	subjugating	her	to	a	form	of	causal	determinism	and	thereby	
depriving	her	of	human	autonomy	and	self-determination.	How	the	
targets	are	disposed	to	act	is,	in	the	eyes	of	the	slur	user,	determined	
and	consequently	 importantly	constrained	by	the	causally	potent	es-
sence.	Members	of	the	targeted	group	are	thus	not	evaluated	by	their	
individual	acts	or	in	relation	to	their	environmental	circumstances,	but	
by	(pre-)determined	membership	in	a	group.11	Crucially,	the	attributed	
essence	is	seen	as	disposing	their	bearers	to	act	badly, or	to	exhibit	neg-
ative features.	Thus,	by	carrying	the	relevant	“group	essence”,	a	black	
or	gay	person	 is	always	predisposed	 to,	 for	example,	exhibit	certain	
traits	or	behaviors	—	even	if	all	available	evidence	indicates	otherwise.	
Taken	together,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	the	application	of	an	essentialized	
11.	 See	Basu	(2019)	for	a	recent	argument	that	epistemically	representing	others	
in	a	way	that	treats	them	as	scientific	objects—i.e.,	essentializes	them—con-
stitutes	a	case	of	wronging.
category	possesses	an	essence	without	knowing	what	the	essence	is”	
(Gelman,	2004,	p.	404;	see	also	Medin	&	Ortony,	1989).9
The	second	component	comprises	stereotype	features	of	the	refer-
ence	group	that,	 in	contrast	 to	ordinary	natural	kind	terms,	must	be	
represented	as	negative.	These	features	provide	a	heuristic	for	the	iden-
tification	of	individuals	of	the	essentialized	group.	That	is,	the	observ-
able	surface	features	—	which	are,	in	the	eyes	of	the	racist,	xenophobe,	
or	 homophobe,	 dominantly	 negative10	—	deliver	 a	 reliable	 indicator	
for	the	presence	of	the	causally	powerful	essence.	And	since	they	are	
caused	by	the	essential	property	in	question,	it	is	assumed	that	mem-
bers	of	the	class	have	an	inherent	disposition	to	exhibit	those	features.	
Thus,	it	is	assumed	that	most,	but	not	necessarily	all,	individuals	of	an	
9.	 Thus,	the	notion	of	“essentialism”	that	I	operate	with	is	the	one	that	is	used	
in	the	literature	on	psychological	essentialism	(Gelman,	2003;	Haslam	et	al.,	
2004;	Medin	&	Ortony,	1989),	which,	in	the	philosophical	literature,	is	some-
times	referred	to	as	“quintessentialism”	(Leslie,	2013).
10.	 The	negativity-aspect	of	the	theory	raises	an	important	question:	What	does	
it	 take	 for	 a	 feature	 to	 be	 negative?	 Generally,	 I	 take	 a	 quasi-subjectivist	
stance	on	this	matter:	A	feature	is	negative	when	it	is	represented	as	negative	
by	a	sufficient	number	of	subjects.	Under	this	conception,	negativity	is	highly	
context-sensitive.	Even	if	a	feature	is	generally	seen	as	positive	or	neutral,	it	
can	become	negative	in	certain	contexts.	For	example,	while	+having	high	
sat	scores	or	+dressing	stylishly	are,	in	and	by	themselves,	positive	quali-
ties,	 they	 are	 evaluated	 as	 threatening	 and	negative	when	 combined	with	
certain	social	outgroups	as	in	the	first	example,	or	certain	genders	as	in	the	
latter.	Similarly,	many	encoded	features,	such	as	skin	tone	or	facial	configura-
tion,	will	be	objectively	absolutely	valence-free,	but	can	either	be	encoded	as	
proxies	for	other	negative	features	and	thus	themselves	become	represented	
as	negative,	or	be	irrationally	encoded	as	negative	in	the	first	place.
	 A	reviewer	also	pointed	out	to	me	that	the	negativity-aspect	of	my	proposed	
semantics	might	create	a	problem	in	accounting	for	sentences	such	as	“I’m	
hopeless	at	fashion.	I	wish	I	knew	some	fag	who	could	just	tell	me	how	to	
dress	to	attract	the	ladies”,	which	should	come	out	infelicitous	under	my	ac-
count,	since	it	is	used	to	ascribe	and	explain	properties	the	speaker	takes	to	
be	positive.	However,	 I	do	not	 think	 this	 is	 correct.	We	often	use	negative	
properties	 of	 others	 to	 our	 favor,	 as	 in:	 “I’m	 in	 love	with	 this	woman,	 but	
she	has	a	husband.	I	wish	I	knew	some	criminal,	bad	person	who	could	help	
me	get	 rid	of	my	problem.”	This	 is	perfectly	coherent,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	
+criminal	or	+bad	are	negative	properties	and	the	speaker	represents	them	
to	be	negative—the	speaker	just	uses	these	negative	properties	to	his	favor.	
For	a	persuasive	response	to	a	similar	objection	by	Camp	(2013),	see	Jeshion	
(2018).
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the	full	spectrum	of	human	autonomy	and	self-determination	that	we	
associate	with	personhood.12 
1.2 Some Helpful Contrasts
One	of	 the	most	 important	 things	 to	emphasize	 is	 that	on	my	view,	
slur	terms	are	not synonymous	with	their	neutral	counterparts.	In	fact,	
my	 account	 of	 slurs	 doesn’t	 appeal	 to	 the	meaning	 of	 their	 neutral	
counterparts	at	all.	 ‘Gay’,	‘Jew’,	or	‘Hispanic’	are	governed	by	conven-
tions	that	crucially	differ	from	‘faggot’,	 ‘kike’,	or	 ‘spic’.	Much	research	
confirms	that	race	concepts	are	highly	essentialized,	an	issue	we	will	
later	cover	in	more	detail.	But	although	‘gay’,	‘Jew’,	or	‘Hispanic’	can	be	
represented	as	socially	essentialized	categories	that	“share	a	common	
nature”	and	facilitate	(especially	negative)	generalizations	(cf.	Dovidio,	
Glick,	&	Rudman,	2005;	Gelman,	2003;	Haslam	&	Levy,	2006;	Haslam,	
Rothschild,	&	Ernst,	2000;	Hirschfeld,	1996;	Leslie,	2017;	Pauker,	Am-
bady,	&	Apfelbaum,	2010;	Prentice	&	Miller,	2007),	 the	meaning	of	
the	nouns	that	refer	to	those	categories	is	still	much	more	innocuous,	
both	with	regard	to	 its	causal	determinism	and	the	stereotypes	 they	
encode.	
First,	even	if	we	say	that	slurs’	neutral	counterparts	are	sometimes	
essentialized,	I	contend	that	the	essence	referred	to	by,	say,	‘chink’	is 
not identical to the	 essence	 of	 ‘Chinese’.	 Also	 under	 the	 assumption	
that	 ethnic	 labels	 sometimes	 function	 as	 kind	 terms,	 the	 kind	 they	
designate	differs	from	the	kind	their	closest	slur-relative	designates.	I	
merely	chose	‘Chinese	essence’	as	a	label	for	the	essence	placeholder	
that	unifies,	in	the	eyes	of	the	racist,	the	alleged	referents	of	the	slur;	I	
could	as	well	have	called	it	‘chinkness	essence’.	Second,	even	persons	
whose	representation	of	 races	or	ethnicities	 is	very	essentialized	do	
12.	 Remember	that	although	slurs	are	a	species	of	kind	terms,	they	possess	a	fea-
ture	that	distinguishes them	from	classic	natural	kind	terms	as	‘water’,	‘gold’,	or	
‘tiger’.	In	the	case	of	‘water’,	the	essence	in	question	is	explanatorily	connected	
to	the	salient	features	of	paradigmatic	instances	of	water;	“that	they	boil	and	
freeze	at	certain	temperatures,	that	they	are	clear,	potable,	and	necessary	to	
life”	(Soames,	2007).	The	valence	of	 the	salient	 features	 is	completely	 irrel-
evant.	In	the	case	of	slurs,	in	contrast,	the	essence	must	be	connected	to	nega-
tive stereotypes	of	the	social	group	in	question.	
slur	term	is	derogating,	demeaning,	and	dehumanizing	to	the	target	
and	the	entire	social	group	she	is	a	member	of	(cf.	fig.	1).
Consider	again	the	analogous	behavior	of	other	concepts	correspond-
ing	to	kind	terms,	e.g.,	the	natural	kind	concept	kangaroo.	We	know	
from	 cognitive	 and	 developmental	 psychology	 that	 young	 children	
think	 that	 kangaroos	 that	 grow	 up	 with	 goats	 will	 nevertheless	 be	
good	at	hopping.	We	act	as	if	kangaroos	are	just made to	hop	(Gelman,	
2004;	Gelman	&	Wellman,	 1991).	So	 just	as	a	kangaroo	cannot	 lose	
its	 “kangaroohood”	 if	 it	 is	 raised	 in	a	goat	 family,	and	 is	disposition-
ally	“made”	to	hop	even	if	 it	doesn’t	do	so	(cf.	 for	an	empirical	over-
view	Gelman,	2003;	2004),	so	are	the	members	of	the	social	groups	
in	 question	 not	 evaluated	 by	 their	 individual	 circumstances	 or	 self-
determined	acts	and	decisions.	This	is	precisely	what	is	responsible	for	
the	dehumanizing	power	of	slurs,	as	the	attribution	of	“essences”	that	
pre-determine	the	target’s	dispositions,	character	traits,	attitudes,	and	
behaviors	creates	a	picture	of	the	target	according	to	which	she	lacks	
group essence
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feature	lists;	rather,	they	encode	information	in	a	way	that	is	causally 
organized.	In	particular,	slurs	relate	prototypical	features	nomologically	
to	causally	powerful	essences.14	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	sections,	the	
causal	elements	explanatorily	differentiate	my	account	from	Croom’s,	
for	they	lead	to	a	number	of	distinct	linguistic	and	psychological	pre-
dictions	about	phenomena	such	as	derogatory	variation,	essentialism	
about	social	groups,	or	nominalization.	Most	importantly,	the	causal	
elements	play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 ensuring	 that	 slurs	will	 come	out	 as	
empty,	as	there	is	and	will	be	no	“deep	essence”	that	explains	features	
associated	with	a	group,	even if the stereotypes, due to effects of structural 
disadvantages, might accurately represent certain members of oppressed 
groups.15 
According	to	Camp’s	perspectival	account	of	slurs,	“slurs	make	two	
distinct,	coordinated	contributions	to	a	sentence’s	conventional	com-
municative	role:	a	truth-conditional	predication	of	group	membership,	
and	endorsement	of	a	derogating	perspective	on	that	group”	(Camp,	
2018,	p.	30).	In	virtue	of	the	second	speech-act,	a	speaker	signals	their	
allegiance	to	a	perspective16	according	to	which	the	target’s	group	mem-
bership	is	explanatory	of	many	of	her	other	properties,	and	predicts	the	
14.	 For	 defenses	 of	 causally-structured	 models	 of	 concepts	 and	 criticisms	 of	
purely	feature-based	models	of	conceptual	representation,	see	Danks,	2014;	
Gelman,	2003;	Murphy,	2004;	Rehder,	2017;	Sloman,	2005;	Sloman,	Love,	&	
Ahn,	1998.
15.	 Notice	 another	 difference:	 To	 explain	 the	 relationship	 between	 neutral	
counterparts	and	slurs,	Croom	posits	a	“conceptual	anchor”,	individuated	by	
the	prototype	property	with	the	largest	feature	weight.	These	features	have	
a	“grounding	role”	insofar	as	they	“serve	as	salient	anchors	for	the	semantic	
or	 conceptual	 content	 of	 slurs”	 (Croom,	 2015,	 p.	 35).	 Although	 properties	
corresponding	 to	 the	 neutral	 counterpart	 will	 often	 have	 high	 inductive	
weight	and	thereby	explain	the	relationship	between	slurs	and	paradigmatic	
targets,	 these	 features,	 on	 my	 account,	 do	 not “ground”	 or	 “anchor”	 the	
meaning	of	slurs,	just	like	+wet	does	not	ground	the	meaning	of	‘water’.
16.	 Camp	characterizes	a	perspective	as	“an	intuitive	tool	for	structuring	thoughts:	
a	disposition	to	notice,	explain,	and	respond	to	some	part	of	the	world	in	cer-
tain	ways.	Perspectives	in	general	may,	but	need	not,	include	any	particular	
propositional	or	attitudinal	commitments;	and	they	are	partly,	but	only	partly,	
under	voluntary	control”	(Camp,	2018,	p.	30).
not	have	to	conceptualize	these	racial	essences	as	causally	linked	to	
negative properties	in	order	to	be	competent	with	the	race	or	ethnicity	
terms. They	can	believe	in	a	“hidden	nature”	of	races	while	not	believ-
ing	that	the	features	caused	by	this	nature	are	mostly	negative.	Thirdly,	
the	convention	governing,	e.g.,	racial	terms	generally	permits	higher	
degrees	of	 causal	 innocence	 than	 the	 linguistic	 conventions	govern-
ing	slur	terms.	This	means	that	it	 is	not necessary	 in	order	to	be	com-
petent	with	 the	 term	 ‘Chinese’	 to	encode	 that	 instances	of	 this	kind	
share	a	causal	essence	that	pre-disposes	them	to	behave	in	negative	
ways.	It	is	possible	to	refer	to	people	with	a	Chinese	background	in	a	
neutral	manner	that	does not	essentialize	them.	In	fact,	many	contexts	
require	even	the	racist	or	homophobe	to	be	aware	of	a	non-essential-
ist	convention	that	is	endorsed	in	the	case	of	racial,	ethnic,	or	sexual	
vocabulary.13 
To	explain	the	mechanics	of	my	view,	it	is	helpful	to	draw	contrasts	
to	some	other,	superficially	similar,	views.	My	account	bears	similari-
ties	to	the	hybrid	family-resemblance	account	by	Adam	Croom	(2011;	
2014a;	2015)	and	the	perspectival	account	by	Elisabeth	Camp	(2013;	
2018).	According	 to	Croom,	 slurs	 contain	 both	 an	 expressive	 and	 a	
descriptive	component,	the	latter	of	which	consists	of	a	list	of	weighed	
prototypical	features.	Since	the	prototypical	features	encoded	by	slurs	
and	their	neutral	counterparts	differ,	it	follows	that	they	are	not	truth-
conditionally	 equivalent.	Although	my	 account,	 like	Croom’s,	 treats	
slurs	as	 informationally	rich,	 there	are	a	number	of	 important	differ-
ences	between	them.	Under	my	account,	slurs	do	not	merely	encode	
13.	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 conventions	governing	 legal	 contexts.	Here,	oc-
currences	of	social	group	terms	such	as	‘homosexual’	have	a	purely	descrip-
tive	meaning	whose	referents	can	be	determined	by	a	fixed	set	of	criteria.	In	
this	case,	it	would	be	something	akin	to	‘everyone	that	has	same-sex	prefer-
ences	or	engages	in	same-sex	behavior’.	As	a	result,	a	racist	or	homophobe	
would	have	to	comprehend	the	neutral-descriptive	meaning	attached	to	the	
neutral	counterparts	in	order	to	be	competent	with	the	terms.	In	contrast,	to	
fully	master	a	slur	word,	“successful	application”	requires	one	to	tacitly	under-
stand	the	causal	story	between	some	essence	and	negative	stereotypes	that	I	
here	outlined.	In	contrast	to	the	convention	of	their	neutral	counterparts,	the	
convention	governing	 slurs	does not leave open	 the	possibility	 of	 a	 causally-
neutral	application.
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will	be	either	true	or	false	of	you.	It	is	precisely	because	of	the	purely	
predicative	function	that	slurs	come	out	as	empty.	
1.3 Objections
Before	we	move	on,	let	me	respond	to	a	salient	objection	against	the	
proposed	model,	namely	that	it	is	too	informationally	demanding	for	
competent	language	speakers.	Two	worries	of	this	type	seem	particu-
larly	concerning.	First,	two	people	can	plausibly	employ	a	slur	in	com-
munication	without	 talking	 past	 each	 other,	 although	 each	 of	 them	
associates	different	stereotypes	with	it.	Second,	someone	can	be	com-
petent	with	a	slur	without	knowing	the	stereotype	associated	with	it.	
In	the	slurs	literature,	these	worries	have	been	spelled	out	by	Robin	
Jeshion	and	Elisabeth	Camp	(Camp,	2013;	Jeshion,	2013b).	However,	
it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	they	are	in	fact	versions	of	familiar,	
more	general	worries	about	rich	views	of	lexical	meaning	that	often	
come	up	outside	of	the	slurs	debate,	such	as	in	discussion	of	inferential	
role	or	prototype	theories	of	concepts	(Fodor,	1998;	Fodor	&	Lepore,	
1992;	Rey,	1983).
The	main	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	assume	a	specific	account	of	lexi-
cal	meaning	as	richly	structured	and	argue	that	it	helps	us	explain	cer-
tain	patterns	that	are	unique	to	slurs.	The	background	semantic	frame-
work	I	assume	is	a	live	option	in	current	debates	about	the	nature	of	
meaning	and	conceptual	structure.18	So	although	I	will	briefly	respond	
to	the	objections	that	have	come	up	against	treating	slurs	along	these	
lines,	the	appropriate	locus	for	a	full	response	to	these	objections	is	
in	 another	 paper	 discussing	 the	 general viability	 of	 this	 approach	 to	
meaning	and	concepts.	
18.	 Issues	 regarding	 the	 richness	 of	 conceptual	 structure	 and	 its	 intersection	
with	linguistic	competence	constitute	an	object	of	ongoing,	vivid	discussion	
in	philosophy	and	the	cognitive	sciences	(see	Block,	1987;	Del	Pinal,	2016;	
2018;	Fodor,	1998;	2005;	Fodor	&	Pylyshyn,	2014;	Gärdenfors,	2000;	Harman,	
1993;	Jönsson,	2017;	Kamp	&	Partee,	1995;	Knobe,	Prasada,	&	Newman,	2013;	
Lakoff,	1987;	Leslie,	2015;	Marconi,	1997;	Prinz,	2012;	Putnam,	1975;	Soames,	
2015;	Taylor,	2009).
display	of	negative	stereotypical	properties.	This	second	speech-act	is	
similar	in	spirit	to	the	semantics	I	propose	here.	
Despite	these	similarities,	there	are	key	differences	between	our	ac-
counts.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	I	only	posit	one,	purely	predicative,	
speech-act	 to	 explain	 the	 semantics	 of	 slurs.	 As	 the	 pure	 truth-con-
ditional	attribution	of	neutral	counterpart	group	membership	doesn’t	
play	 any	 role	 on	my	 account,	Camp’s	 first,	 predicational	 speech-act	
comes	out	as	explanatorily	redundant	on	my	account.	As	a	result	of	
this	difference,	the	accounts	diverge	with	regard	to	some	key	linguistic	
predictions,	which	we	will	assess	in	the	next	section.	As	with	Croom,	
one	of	 the	crucial	predictive	differences	 is	 that	predications	of	 slurs	
always	come	out	false	under	my	account,	whereas	they	often	come	out	
as	true	for	the	predicative	speech-act	component	of	Camp’s	account.17 
But	also	the	second,	perspectival	speech-act	does	not	do	what	slurs	
do	under	my	construal.	According	to	Camp’s	characterization	of	this	
second	speech-act,	“slurs	are	akin	to	other	expressions	[like	‘tu’/‘vous’	
or	slang	expressions	for	parents,	food,	or	genitals],	part	of	whose	con-
ventional	function	is	not	merely	to	refer	or	predicate,	but	to	signal	the	
speaker’s	 social,	 psychological,	 and/or	 emotional	 relation	 to	 that	 se-
mantic	value”	(Camp,	2013,	p.	335);	thus,	slurs	contribute	“a (broadly) 
expressive, perspectival element to the conversation”	(my	emphasis;	Camp,	
2018,	p.	48).	The	latter	quote	is	instructive:	The	second	speech-act	is	
broadly	expressive,	because	it	is	about the	speaker’s	perspective	on	a	
referent.	 In	 contrast,	 although	 they	 can	 reveal	 something	 about	my	
perspective	—	just	as	calling	a	chair	“sofa”	can	reveal	something	about	
my	perspective	on	the	chair	—	slurs	are	not	about perspectives	on	my	
account.	In	my	view,	slurs’	meaning	is	predicative	in	the	full-fledged,	
traditional	sense.	What	slurs	say of	you	is	that	you	have	some	group	es-
sence	that	disposes	you	to	display	bad	features;	thus,	a	slur-predication	
17.	 Another	difference	 is	 that	Camp	explicitly	 rejects	 that	slurs,	generally,	 con-
ventionally	 encode	 stereotypes.	However,	 because	 she	 suspects	 that	 some	
slurs	do	encode	stereotypes,	I	will	treat	this	difference	as	not	too	important	
(see	Camp,	2013).
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it,	what	they	are	like,	and	I	don’t	care.	I	just	think	those	
queers	should	be	locked	up.”	(Jeshion,	2013b,	p.	322)
Assuming	that	the	intuition	Jeshion	capitalizes	on	is	generalizable,20 
the	essentialist	theory	has	the	resources	to	account	for	it.	The	speaker	
in	 (1)	 has	 to	do	quite	 some	work	 and	 introduce	 a	 variety	of	 qualifi-
cations	 to	get	 their	 intended,	minimal	meaning	of	 ‘queer’	across.	Al-
though	 the	 speaker	 rejects	 many	 stereotypes,	 one	 surface	 property	
that	 the	speaker	regards	as	highly	negative	 is	 left,	which	 they	make	
salient	through	“anyone	who	would	do that	 is	sick”.	According	to	my	
theory,	the	context	of	utterance	makes	it	clear	that	the	speaker	means	
to	pick	out	someone	who	bears	the	“queerness	essence”,	which	makes	
the	person	inherently	sick	and	causally	explains	the	property	of	same-
sex	behavior,	which,	 in	the	eyes	of	 the	speaker,	 is	clearly	negative.21 
And	although	we	can	make	sense	of	this	contextually	modified	case	in	
a	way	fully	compatible	with	the	essentialist	theory,	the	standing	mean-
ing	of	‘queer’	will	still	be	one	that	fully	corresponds	to	the	semantics	
I	propose	—	i.e.,	one	in	which	more	than	only	the	minimal	stereotype	
is	communicated.
20.	As	has	been	pointed	out	before	(Camp,	2013),	it	is	unclear	how	uniform	the	
intuitions	about	(1)	are,	and	thus	whether	our	theory	should	accommodate	
this	 data	 point.	 I,	 for	 one,	 have	 extreme	 difficulties	 making	 sense	 of	 (1),	
especially	if	schematically	replaced	with	other	slurs.	Here’s	one	reason	that	
might	 explain	my	difficulty.	 It	 seems	 to	be	 a	 true	generalization	 that	 slurs	
emerge	in	communities	that	interact	with	the	people	they	are	slurring.	This	
is	why	slurs	are	often	fairly	meaningless	to	people	who	are	from	cultures	or	
communities	that	are	not	in	touch	with	the	slurred	group	in	question.	But	if	
this	 is	 true,	 it	will	also	be	 true	 that,	due	 to	 interaction	with	slurred	groups,	
these	communities	and	competent	users	within	them will	have	stereotypes	
of	these	members.	It	is	therefore	fairly	difficult	to	imagine	that	anyone	who	
is	competent	with	a	slur	could	utter	something	like	(1).	Notice	that	Jeshion	
herself	goes	on	to	explain	that	“[m]uch	racism	and	bigotry	is	rooted	simply	
on	 finding	 others	 ‘different’—often	 because	 of	 physical	 characteristics”	 (p.	
322).	+different	or	+physical	characteristic	c,	however,	are	stereotypical	
properties	 of	 the	 same	 status	 as	 the	 stereotypes	 Jeshion	 dismisses	 as	
semantically	encoded	(e.g.,	+sexually	promiscuous).
21.	 And	possibly	a	number	of	other	negative	properties	that	the	speaker	leaves	
open.
A	number	of	philosophers	and	cognitive	scientists	have	presented	
convincing	replies	 to	 the	first	worry	 (see,	e.g.,	Chomsky,	2000;	Har-
man,	1993;	Marconi,	1997;	Smith,	Medin,	&	Rips,	1984).	Their	strategy	
emphasizes	 that,	holding	 the	 level	of	 competence	fixed,	similarity of 
conceptual content	is	all	we	need	to	explain	the	stability	of	meaning	be-
tween	different	speakers,	and,	for	that	matter,	communicative	success.	
More	concretely,	 if	 the	mental	 concepts	 that	 two	speakers	associate	
with	a	word	are	sufficiently	similar,	we	would	expect	that	information	
exchange,	in	most	cases,	proceeds	smoothly.19	Appealing	to	high	simi-
larity	instead	of	strict	identity	also	explains	the	fact	that	we	sometimes	
miscommunicate	or	are	in	disagreement	about	the	extension	of	a	giv-
en	 term	 in	borderline	cases.	 If	 the	meaning	of	every	word	 type	was	
strictly	identical	between	each	competent	speaker,	these	phenomena	
would	become	a	mystery.	Thus,	modeling	meaning	stability	in	terms	
of	 content	 similarity	allows	 for	 communicative	 success	and	exceeds	
the	descriptive	accuracy	of	a	strict	identity	view.	This	point	can	directly	
be	applied	to	slurs.	Due	to	similarity	of	content,	communication	will	
proceed	“smoothly”	in	most	cases.	Only	in	rare	borderline	cases,	com-
munication	between	two	subjects	might	be	unsuccessful.
Let	us	turn	to	the	second	worry.	Is	it	possible	to	be	competent	with	
the	meaning	of	a	slur	and	not	have	knowledge	of	any	associated	ste-
reotype?	According	 to	 Jeshion,	 someone	can	coherently	and	compe-
tently	utter
(1)	“I	disdain	those	queers;	anyone	who	would	do	that	is	
sick.	But	I	do	not	endorse	those	[stereotypes]	as	the	right	
way	of	 thinking	about	queers.	 I	have	no	 idea	who	does	
19.	 This	point	is	quite	important	and	often	neglected	in	discussions	of	conceptions	
of	meaning	that	appeal	to	stereotypes.	It	belongs	to	the	operationalization	of	
a	stereotype	that	it is highly stable:	Something	is	a	stereotype	only if it is highly 
stable	 in	a	population.	 If	 there	was	no	cross-subject	stability,	we	would	not	
call	a	given	property	a	 stereotype.	Relatedly,	 if	 stereotypes	allowed	 for	high	
variability,	we	would	not	get	reliable	and	replicable	effects	in	experimental	
paradigms	 and	 hence	 wouldn’t	 be	 able	 to	 find	 any	 stereotype	 effects	 in	
controlled	 settings—but	 we	 do.	 Also	 detrimental	 phenomena	 such	 as	 the	
stereotype	threat	would	not	be	very	worrisome	if	the	associations	triggered	
were	as	variable	across	subjects	as	is	suggested	by	the	objection.
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linguistic	community,	she	will	be	disposed	to	update	her	entry	for	the	
slur	if	she	takes	her	interlocutors	to	be	linguistic	authorities.	
§2: Slurs in Natural Language 
Having	 presented	 the	 view,	 I	 will	 now	 demonstrate	 its	 explanatory	
reach.	 Slurs	 exhibit	 unique	 linguistic	 patterns	 that	 have	 proven	 dif-
ficult	to	capture.	However,	since	these	data	are	acknowledged	as	ex-
planatorily	 central	 for	 a	 successful	 theory	of	 slurs,	 any	 adequate	 ac-
count	must	have	the	resources	to	explain	them.	The	data	include:	(1)	
G-extending,	 (2)	G-contracting,	 and	 (3)	G-referencing	 uses	 of	 slurs	
(Croom,	2015;	Jeshion,	2013a),	(4)	non-derogatory,	non-appropriated	
uses	of	slurs	(Hom,	2008;	Jeshion,	2013a),	(5)	intuitions	about	null-ex-
tension	and	falsehood	(Hom,	2008;	Hom	&	May,	2013;	Richard,	2008;	
Sennet	&	Copp,	2015),	(6)	projection	behavior	(Anderson	&	Lepore,	
2013;	Camp,	2013;	2018;	Cepollaro	&	Stojanovic,	2016;	Jeshion,	2013b;	
Potts,	2007)	and	(7)	derogatory	variation	of	slurs	(Bolinger,	2017;	Hom,	
2008;	Jeshion,	2013a;	Nunberg,	2018;	Popa-Wyatt,	2016).	In	what	fol-
lows,	I	will	go	through	these	linguistic	phenomena	and	demonstrate	
that	the	essentialist	theory	can	handle	them	in	a	direct,	non-stipulative	
way.	
(1) G-extending Uses of Slurs
Imagine	the	following	sentence	as	uttered	by	a	high	school	student	to	
describe	his	classmate	John,	who	doesn’t	like	sports	and	has	interests	
in	art:	
(2)	“John	is	not	gay,	but	he	is	still	a	faggot.”
Similarly,	we	can	imagine	another	high	school	student	rejecting	(3a),	
yet	accepting	(3b):
(3)	a.	“John	is	gay.”
					b.	“John	is	a	faggot.”
The	first	thing	to	notice	here	is	that	intuitively,	it	seems	to	be	perfectly	
Drawing	 on	 Putnam’s	 division	 of	 linguistic	 labor	 (Putnam,	 1975),	
we	can	furthermore	appeal	to	partial	linguistic	competence	and	defer-
ence	to	experts	to	accommodate	Jeshion’s	worry.	Can	we	say	of	Put-
nam	that	he	is	linguistically	competent	with	the	word	‘elm’,	even	if	his	
associated	prototypes	of	‘elm’	and	‘beech’	are	identical?	In	some	sense,	
yes:	He	knows	that	‘elm’	is	a	natural	kind	term	and	designates	some	
“elm	essence”	that	explains	common	properties	of	elms.	He	will	not	be	
at	total	loss	in	linguistic	discourse	about	elms,	and	he	will	have	an	idea	
about	the	reference	of	the	term	when	elms	are	nearby.	He	himself	will	
also	be	able	to	apply	the	term	correctly	in	many	circumstances.	How-
ever,	Putnam	also	knows	that	there	are	degrees of competence,	and	that	
there	are	‘elm’	experts	in	his	linguistic	community	whose	referential	
and	inferential	competence	with	the	term	exceeds	his.	Thus,	Putnam	
is	disposed	to	take	the	‘elm’	expert	as	a	linguistic	authority	when	the	
circumstances	require,	and	revise	his	concept	in	accordance	with	the	
expert’s	more	fine-grained	one.	Although	Putnam	can	be	said	 to	be	
competent	with	the	word	‘elm’,	he	certainly	does	not	have	the	expert’s	
degree	of	linguistic	competence.
This	point	can	be	applied	to	(1).	Suppose	that	a	speaker	is	ignorant	
of	 the	 stereotype	 speakers	 associate	with	 the	 slur.	All	 she	 knows	 is	
that	it	is	used	towards	people	with	the	surface	property	+homosexual. 
Can	we	say	that	she	is	competent	with	the	slur?	Again,	in	some	sense,	
yes.	Since	she	knows	that	the	term	is	a	slur,	she	knows	that	it	denotes	
an	essence	that	must	explain	the	feature	+homosexual	and	some	oth-
er	features.	Thus,	in	many	circumstances,	she	will	be	able	to	use	the	
term	appropriately,	including	to	draw	the	right	inferences	from	it	and	
pick	 out	 its	 intended	 referents.	 But	 again,	 since	 competence	 comes	
in	degrees,	we	wouldn’t	say	that	the	speaker	is	fully competent:	There	
will	be	situations	in	which	she	will	be	confused	about	the	referent	of	
the	word	—	for	example,	in	cases	in	which	the	intended	referent	of	a	
more	competent	user	does	not	engage	in	same-sex	behavior,	but	ex-
hibits	 other	 stereotypes	 that	 license	 inference	 to	 the	 essence.	 Since	
the	 speaker	also	knows	 that	 there	are	 “experts”	of	 the	 term	 in	 their	
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My	essentialist	theory	can	handle	the	examples	in	(2)	and	(3)	quite	
smoothly.	Consider	the	homophobe	uttering	(2).	Since	in	my	theory,	
slurs	are	not	synonymous	with	their	neutral	counterparts,	a	contradic-
tion	is	not	predicted.	This	would	only	be	so	if	the	application	of	the	
slur	would	entail the	application	of	 ‘having	homosexual	preferences’.	
But	attribution	of	the	slur	term	does	not imply	attribution	of	the	neutral	
counterpart	 term.	Recall	fig.	1:	+negative	 stereotype	x	 is	only	a	sur-
face	feature	of	the	underlying	“group	essence”	cause.	Thus,	the	deep	
and	hidden	“gay	essence”	and	the	superficially	instantiated	feature	of	
homosexual	preferences	have	crucially	different	causal	roles.	While	it	
certainly	has	important	stereotypical	weight,	it	is	possible	to	cancel	the	
feature	of	homosexual	preferences,	as	long	as	the	non-changing	“gay	
essence”,	in	the	eyes	of	the	slur	user,	“stays	present”.	This	is	precisely	
what	happens	 in	 (2).	The	homophobe’s	 concept	of	 ‘faggot’	 encodes	
a	mini-theory,	according	 to	which	 the	unobservable	causal	property	
of	a	“gay	essence”	causes	and	explains	observable,	negative	features.	
These	stereotypical	features,	in	turn,	are	the	observational	heuristics	
the	homophobe	uses	to	“spot”	the	“gay	essence”.	Since	John	presum-
ably	exhibits	enough	of	 those	features,	 the	speaker	uttering	(2)	“effi-
ciently”	expresses	that	John,	although	not	in	the	extension	of	gay	peo-
ple,	shares	some	gayness	“essence”	that	causes	him	to	exhibit	negative	
traits	correlated	with	gayness	and	thus	falls	under	the	extension	of	the	
slur.	
Jeshion	 (2013a)	 dubs	 cases	 such	 as	 the	 ones	 in	 (2)	 and	 (3)	—	in	
which	the	slur	is	applied	to	a	target	that	doesn’t	belong	to	the	group	
paradigmatically	 associated	 with	 the	 slur	—	“G-extending”	 uses	 of	
slurs.24	Some	 theorists	have	 tried	 to	explain	away	G-extending	uses	
by	stipulating	that	they	are	non-literal	(e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	
Jeshion,	2013a);	therefore,	a	theory	of	slurs	need	not	account	for	these	
uses.	However,	none	of	 these	 theorists	has	offered	an	argument that 
shows	 that	 these	uses	are	non-literal.	The	usual	move	 is	 to	point	 to	
24.	 In	her	extremely	insightful	analysis	of	the	linguistic	behavior	of	slurs,	Jeshion	
(2013a)	introduces	the	distinction	between	G-referencing,	G-extending,	and	
G-retracting	uses	of	slurs.
possible	to	utter	(2)	(or	or	to	disagree	to	(3a)	yet	accept	(3b),	for	that	
matter)	—	intuitively,	 it	does	not	express	any	contradiction.22	Howev-
er,	 if	 ‘gay	man’	and	 ‘faggot’	were truth-conditionally	equivalent,	as	 is	
defended	in	many	prominent	accounts	on	slurs,	(2)	should	express	a	
semantic	contradiction	that	can	only	be	“rescued”	pragmatically.	For	
example,	Anderson	and	Lepore’s	minimalist	 analysis	 treats	 slurs’	 se-
mantic	content	to	be	exhausted	by	the	truth-conditional	content	of	the	
neutral	counterpart	(Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013).	Also	Jeshion’s	expres-
sivist	account	treats	slurs’	truth-conditional	contribution	to	be	equiva-
lent	to	the	truth-conditional	contribution	of	the	neutral	counterpart;	
an	expressive	element	of	contempt	is	added	to	account	for	the	deroga-
tory	 properties	 of	 slurs	 (Jeshion,	 2013a).	 And	 as	we	 saw	 earlier,	 ac-
cording	to	Camp,	one	of	the	speech-acts	slur	users	engage	in	is	a	pure	
predication	of	membership	 in	 the	neutral	 counterpart	group	(Camp,	
2013;	2018).	Thus,	in	all	these	cases,	it	would	not	be	possible	to	be	in	
the	extension	of	‘faggot’	without	being	in	the	extension	of	‘gay	man’.23 
The	second	thing	to	notice	is	not	only	that	(2)	is	usually	not	perceived	
as	a	contradiction,	but	we	also	have	immediate,	clear	intuitions	about	
the	information	it	conveys.	Namely,	that	John	is	not	in	the	extension	
of	 men	 with	 a	 homosexual	 orientation,	 but	—	probably	 because	 he	
shares	salient	stereotypical	features	associated	with	gay	persons,	such	
as	talking	about	“female”	topics,	being	physically	“weak”,	or	dressing	
stylishly	—	is	in	the	extension	of	‘faggot’.	
22.	Note	that	G-extending	uses	of	‘faggot’	are	extremely	common.	As	sociologist	
C.	J.	Pascoe	notices	in	her	study	on	masculinity	and	sexuality	in	high	school,	
“[a]	boy	could	get	called	a	fag	for	exhibiting	any	sort	of	behavior	defined	as	
unmasculine	 (although	not	necessarily	behaviors	aligned	with	 femininity):	
being	stupid	or	 incompetent,	dancing,	caring	 too	much	about	clothing,	be-
ing	too	emotional,	or	expressing	interest	(sexual	or	platonic)	in	other	guys”	
(Pascoe,	2012,	p.	57).
23.	 The	 same	point	 applies	 to	 the	analyses	 in	Bach	 (2018);	Cepollaro	&	Stoja-
novic	(2016);	Hom	(2008);	Hom	and	May	(2013;	2015);	Hornsby	(2001);	Nun-
berg	(2018);	Potts	(2004);	Schlenker	(2007);	Sennet	and	Copp	(2015);	Whit-
ing	(2013);	and	Williamson	(2009),	because	they	either	include	the	meaning	
of	 the	 neutral	 counterpart	 into	 the	 truth-conditional	meaning	 of	 a	 slur,	 or	
treat	slurs	and	neutral	counterparts	as	truth-conditionally	equivalent	(condi-
tional	on	the	existence	on	a	neutral	counterpart	term—see	Nunberg,	2018).
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						b.	“I	know	you	haven’t	lied,	but	deep	down,	you’re	a	
liar.”
Intuitively,	taking	the	slur	usages	in	(4)	to	(6a)	to	be	non-literal	seems	
implausible.	This	point	is	strengthened	if	we	look	at	the	use	of	‘liar’	in	
(6b).	 In	(6b),	which	parallels	(6a),	what	the	speaker	 is	 literally	accus-
ing	me	of	and	is	thus	accountable	for	is	being,	deep	down,	a	liar.	To	
say	 that	 ‘liar’	 is	 used	 in	 a	 non-literal	 sense	 therefore	 seems	 unjusti-
fied.	Similarly,	it	is	difficult	to	make	sense	of	the	claim	that	the	speaker	
in	(6a)	labels	someone	with	the	slur	in	any	non-literal	way	—	after	all,	
the	speaker	claims	that	this	is	what	the	targeted	person,	deep	down,	
is.	 The	 intended	meanings	 of	 (4)–(6)	 are	 furthermore	 directly	 avail-
able,	 even	 though	 the	objects	of	 discourse	don’t	 belong	 to	 the	neu-
tral	counterpart	groups	in	question	and	the	slurs	have	been	combined	
with	modifiers	that	don’t	seem	to	call	for	metaphorical	readings,	such	
as	‘true’	and	‘real’.	These	data,	while	not	absolutely	decisive,	seriously	
undermine	the	claim	that	G-extending	are	non-literal	uses	of	slurs.	
(2) G-contracting Uses of Slurs
In	so-called	“G-contracting”	uses	of	slurs,	the	domain	of	possible	tar-
gets	is	contracted:	It	is	made	explicit	that	the	range	of	a	slur	is	not	the	
entire	neutral	counterpart	group	that	is	predominantly	associated	with	
a	slur	(see	Jeshion,	2013a):
(7)	“I	don’t	have	anything	against	feminists	—	in	fact,	I’m	a	
feminist	myself.	What	I	hate	are	these	feminazis.”
(8)	“Although	my	best	friend	is	gay,	you	can	be	sure	that	
he’s	not	a	faggot.”
(9)	“Thank	God!	My	new	neighbors	are	lesbians,	but	they	
are	not	dykes.”
As	with	G-extending	examples,	(7)–(9)	are	perfectly	meaningful,	fairly	
common	examples	of	slur	usage.29	As	before,	a	number	of	accounts	
29.	For	a	selection	of	other	G-contracting	examples	as	evidence	against	co-refer-
entialism	about	slurs,	see	Croom	(2015).
other	cases	of	metaphorical	language-use	and	assume	that	these	cases	
and	G-extending	 uses	 of	 slurs	 are	 parallel.	 However,	whether these	
uses	are	parallel	is	precisely	what	is	at	stake	—	I	haven’t	yet	seen	a	de-
fense	of	this	claim	that	establishes,	and	not	simply	assumes,	that	they	
are.25	In	fact,	it	is	no	surprise	that	these	theories	advocate	the	non-liter-
alness	solution;	otherwise,	G-extending	uses	would	falsify	their	theo-
ries.	And	although	it	is	not	my	claim	that	this	strategy	is	in	principle	
unavailable	to	debunk	the	data	in	(2)	and	(3),	it	is	important	to	note	
that	 the	essentialist	 theory	provides	us	with	a	plausible	explanation	
that	takes	the	data	at	face	value	and	captures	them	without	having	to	
rely	on	moves	that	treat	G-extending	uses	as	non-literal.26
Note	also	that	G-extending	uses	of	slurs	as	the	one	in	(2)	are	com-
monplace	in	the	everyday	language	of	slur	users.27	Their	meaning	is	
available	 immediately	 and	 effortlessly,	 so	 there	 is	prima facie	 strong	
motivation	for	taking	these	highly	conventional	uses	to	be	literal.28	Ad-
ditional	evidence	comes	from	constructions	with	modifiers	and	quali-
fiers	such	as	‘true’,	‘real’,	and	‘deep	down’:
(4)	“Although	Leyla	isn’t	a	socialist,	she’s	still	a	true/real	
commie.”
(5)	“Although	Jack	isn’t	Italian,	he’s	still	a	true/real	dago.”
(6)	 a.	 “I	 know	 that	 he’s	 not	 gay,	 but	 deep	 down,	 he’s	 a	
faggot.”
25.	 The	cleanest	 test	 I	can	 think	of	 in	which	 two	quite	uncontroversially	 truth-
conditionally	equivalent	open	class	expressions	in	different	word	forms	are	
employed	in	a	way	similar	to	(2)	is	“Guillermo	is	not	a	bachelor,	but	he	is	an	
unmarried	man”.	This	example,	however,	does	not	pattern	with	(2)	or	(3).	It	is	
incredibly	hard,	if	not	impossible,	to	make	sense	of	the	statement.	
26.	Also	Cepollaro	(2017)	notices	that	it	is	never	argued	for,	but	always	assumed,	
that	G-extending	uses	and	other	metaphorical	language	uses	are	parallel.
27.	 See	fn.	22.
28.	One	might	think	that	this	data	would	also	be	compatible	with	an	analysis	of	
slurs	in	terms	of	conventional	implicature	(e.g.,	Copp,	2009;	Whiting,	2013;	
Williamson,	2009);	however,	note	that	the	conventional	implicature	analyses	
on	offer	will	still	predict	that	(2)	and	(3)	result	in	contradictions.
	 eleonore	neufeld An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs
philosophers’	imprint	 –		12		– vol.	19,	no.	35	(august	2019)
(10)	“Let’s	watch	the	movie	with	those	cunts	in	it.”
(11)	“Of	course,	the	kraut	made	me	fail	the	exam.”	
(12)	 “The	 University	 of	 Southern	 California	 is	 full	 of	
chinks.”
It	is	important	to	show	that	my	theory	does	not	only	account	for	the	
tricky	 linguistic	cases,	but	also	gets	the	basic	data	right.	We	want	to	
know	why	the	application	of	slurs	 to	those	groups	 is	“licensed”,	and	
why	the	uses	in	question	are	derogatory.	According	to	my	theory,	in	
each	case,	the	targets	are	attributed,	on	the	basis	of	some	observable	
surface	features,	a	Chinese,	German,	or	female	“essence”	which	caus-
ally	determines	a	set	of	negative	features.	The	attribution	is	“licensed”	
because	members	of	the	neutral	counterpart	group,	in	the	eyes	of	the	
racist	 or	 homophobe,	 just	 are	 the	 paradigmatic	 instantiators	 of	 fea-
tures	that	indicate	the	presence	of	the	relevant	essence.	In	most	cases,	
already	 instantiating	 surface	 features	 such	 as	 +looking	 female	 or 
+being	german	will	have	sufficient	inductive	power	as	to	license	the	
inference	to	the	relevant	essence	for	the	slur	user.	This	accounts	for	
the	meaning	profile	we	attribute	to	(10)–(12).	The	slurs	then	generally 
apply	 to	 the	 targets	 that	belong	 to	 the	 social	 group	we	 call	 ‘neutral	
counterpart’,	because,	in	the	in	the	eyes	of	the	slur	user,	the	mentioned	
surface	features	generally	license	application.	The	uses	are	derogatory:	
Making	members	of	the	social	group	in	question	subject	to	this	causal-
deterministic	essentialization	conveys	to	them	that	they	don’t	deserve	
the	full	respect	we	grant	persons	qua persons.
(4) Non-derogatory, Non-appropriated Uses of Slurs
Another	species	of	slur	that	is	often	considered	problematic	in	the	lit-
erature	are	non-derogatory	examples	of	slur	uses,	sometimes	termed	
“non-weapon”	 (Jeshion,	 2013a)	 or	 “NDNA”	 uses	 (where	 “NDNA”	
stands	for	“non-derogatory,	non-appropriated”;	see	Hom,	2008).	One	
example	of	an	NDNA	use	is	(from	Hom,	2008):
predict	that	this	type	of	sentence	yields	a	semantic	contradiction,	since	
they	subscribe	to	the	view	that	slurs	and	their	neutral	counterpart	are	
truth-conditionally	 equivalent.30	 Since	 slurs	 and	 their	 neutral	 coun-
terparts	are	truth-conditionally	equivalent,	it	is	not	possible	to	apply	
the	neutral	counterpart	term	to	someone	while	denying	that	the	target	
belongs	 to	 the	 set	denoted	by	 the	 slurring	noun.31	According	 to	 the	
essentialist	theory,	the	meaning	of	slurs	and	their	counterparts	is	not 
equivalent.	Thus,	a	slur	user	can	deny	that	someone	has	an	“essence”	
that	causes	negative	properties	while	attributing	the	bare	property	of	
homosexual	preferences	 to	him.	This	 is	 the	case	 if	 the	object	of	 the	
discourse,	 in	 the	eyes	of	 the	slur	user,	does	not	exhibit	sufficient sur-
face	features	that	would	license	the	inductive	inference	to	the	“gayness	
essence”.	And	 this	fits	 the	 intuition	 for	 (8):	While	 the	person	under	
discussion	has	homosexual	preferences,	we	take	the	sentence	to	mean	
that	he	will	lack	many	features	associated	with	a	“gay	nature”.	
(3) G-referencing Uses of Slurs
In	 so-called	 “G-referencing”	uses	of	 slurs,	 the	slurred	 target	belongs	
to	the	social	group	that	is	predominantly	associated	with	the	slur	in	
question.	These	cases	are	commonly	considered	the	most	basic	cases	
of	slur	usage.	(10)–(12)	illustrate	these	G-referencing	uses:
30.	As	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 advocates	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 slurs	 and	 their	
neutral	 counterparts	 are	 truth-conditionally	 equivalent	 can	 resort	 to	 the	
claim	 that	 the	slur	uses	 in	 (7)–(9)	are	non-literal.	Again,	 I	don’t	 claim	 that	
there	are	no	strategies	 for	 these	 theories	 to	accommodate	 this	data	point—
after	all,	pragmatic	moves	are	always	available	to	explain	any	phenomenon	
away.	However,	leaving	aside	the	reasons	I	gave	in	the	last	section	against	a	
pragmatic	and	in	favor	of	a	semantic	analysis,	I’d	like	to	re-emphasize	that	the	
essentialist	theory	accommodates	this	phenomenon	smoothly	without	relying 
on	additional	pragmatic	explanations	and	is	therefore	arguably	explanatorily	
more	powerful.	
31.	 In	fact,	accounts	under	which	semantic	content	is	exhausted	by	truth-condi-
tional	content	(e.g.,	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Nunberg,	2018)	predict	that	
G-contracting	sentences	are	semantically	identical	to	their	G-extending	coun-
terpart	sentences,	 since	⟦slur⟧ = ⟦counterpart⟧.	This	prediction	hasn’t	been	
made	explicit	in	the	literature	to	my	knowledge,	but	strikes	me	as	worrisome.
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(5) Null-extension 
We	have	 seen	 that	 an	 (empirical)	 consequence	of	my	 framework	 is	
that	most	slurs	—	importantly,	the	ones	we	regard	as	particularly	tox-
ic	—	don’t have any extension	in	the	actual	world.	In	these	cases,	scientific	
discovery	has	revealed	that	nothing	is	such	that	it	has	a	causal	“nature”	
of	a	social	group	that	explains	and	dispositionally	causes	the	posses-
sion	of	stereotypically	bad	features.	There	is,	of	course,	no	such	thing	
as	a	 “Latino	essence”	 that	dispositionally	causes	Latin	Americans	 to	
harass	women	or	work	in	the	service	industry.	There	is	no	such	thing	
as	 a	 “blackness	 essence”	 that	dispositionally	 causes	black	people	 to	
dislike	work	or	engage	in	criminal	activities.	And	so	on.	Slur	terms	are	
not	true	of	anything,	and	consequently,	sentences	predicating	slurs	of	
individuals	are	either	meaningless	or	false.	Thus,	analogously	to	terms	
like	 ‘phlogiston’,	 slurs	 are	 examples	 of	 kind	 terms	 that	 have	 simply	
been	unsuccessfully	introduced.	A	core	condition	for	successful	intro-
duction	of	a	kind	term	is	that	it	is	correct that	supposed	similarities	of	a	
kind	have	a	“single	unifying	explanation”	(Soames,	2010,	p.	89),	which,	
for	slurs,	is	simply	not	the	case.	The	intuition	that	sentences	such	as	
(15)	“There	are	dykes.”
(16)	“Jews	are	kikes.”
(17)	“All	women	are	cunts.”	
strike	us	as	obviously	false	is	therefore	easily	captured	by	the	essen-
tialist	theory.	
One	question	that	arises	here	is	whether	essentialism	about	slurs	
really	secures	null-extension.	Oppressed,	socially-constructed	groups	
can	be	subject	to	unjust	practices	that,	given	the	world	as	it	is,	connect	
a	metalinguistic	use	could	pick	up	on	and	(b)	no	reading	in	which	a	comment	
on	a	linguistic	item	is	made	is	available	to	me,	since	(c)	‘as’	clearly	introduces	
an	intensional	context,	it	is	unclear	to	me	how	a	metalinguistic	analysis	for	
this	case	should	work.	But	since	the	main	focus	in	this	part	of	the	paper	is	
to	motivate	the	essentialist	theory	by	showing	that	it	covers	a	wide	range	of	
data,	and	not	so	much	on	refuting	alternative	theories,	I	will	leave	this	issue	
aside	for	now.	
(13)	“Institutions	that	treat	Chinese	as	chinks	are	morally	
depraved.”
Accounts	that	treat	slurs	as	truth-conditionally	equivalent	to	their	neu-
tral	counterpart	terms	predict	that	(13)	is	true	exactly	when	(14)	is:
(14)	 “Institutions	 that	 treat	Chinese	as	Chinese	are	mor-
ally	depraved.”
But	intuitively,	many	speakers	would	assign	truth	to	(13)	while	reject-
ing	 (14).	 In	addition,	many	expressivist	 accounts	predict	 that	 (13)	 is	
derogatory,	 since	 each	 assertion	 of	 a	 proposition	 containing	 a	 slur	
is	 an	 expression	 of	 contempt.	 However,	 according	 to	 some	 theo-
rists	—	prominently,	Chris	Hom	—	(13)	 is	 an	 instance	of	 a	non-derog-
atory	(even	if	upsetting,	triggering,	and	hence	offensive)	speech-act.32
By	now,	it	should	be	clear	how	my	account	explains	the	fact	that	
(13)	is	felicitous	and	at	least	different	in	derogatory	status	from	the	ex-
amples	we	encountered	earlier.	‘Chinese’	and	‘chink’	are	not	synony-
mous	according	to	my	account;	only	the	latter	term	is	true	of	those	in-
dividuals	that	share	a	“Chinese	essence”	which	causes	them	to	exhibit	
negative	 stereotypical	 features.	 The	 speaker	 of	 (13)	 thus	 expresses	
that	institutions	that	treat	the	group	of	Chinese	people	in	this	causally	
deterministic	manner	are	morally	depraved	—	which	is	evidently	true	
and	thus	accords	with	our	truth-intuitions.33
32.	 Like	 others,	 I	 have	 the	 intuition	 that	 even	 uses	 in	 intensional	 contexts	
like	(13)	will	be	upsetting	or	offensive,	e.g.,	as	a	result	of	 triggering	effects.	
However,	we	might	still	want	to	agree	with	Hom	that	there	is	some	principled	
difference	in	degree	of	derogation (as	opposed	to	offensiveness)	between	non-
NDNA	uses	and	NDNA	uses,	and	expect	a	theory	to	capture	this	difference.	
Alternatively,	 the	slur	might	 trigger	an	existential	presupposition	such	 that	
derogation	projects	out	even	 in	 this	 intensional	context,	 in	which	case	 the	
phenomenon	would	fall	under	my	later	discussion	of	derogatory	projection.	
33.	 A	reviewer	pointed	out	to	me	that	NDNA	uses	of	this	kind	could	be	analyzed	
metalinguistically.	Although	I	understand—in	fact,	as	will	become	clear	in	the	
next	sections,	advocate—this	point	when	applied	to	some	cases	of	negation	
(as	has	been	done,	for	example,	in	Anderson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bolinger,	2017;	
Jeshion,	2013a;	and	particularly	rigorously	in	Cepollaro,	2017),	it	is	hard	for	
me	to	see	how	a	metalinguistic	move	can	be	applied	to	(13).	Especially	in	light	
of	the	fact	that	(a)	no	slur	is	mentioned	before	the	occurrence	of	the	slur	that	
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sufficiently	many	features	of	the	feature	list	associated	with	a	slur	S,	S	
is	true of	P.	However,	it	is	not	implausible	that	there	will	be	individuals	
that	happen	to	exhibit	the	features	associated	with	the	slur	—	as	a	mat-
ter	of	structural	injustices,	or	simply	because	of	their	very	individual	
life	choices.	Thus,	the	extension	of	slurs	will	not	be	the	empty	set	un-
der	Croom’s	account.	Specifically,	a	sentence	such	as	
(18)	“Alberto	is	a	spic.”
would	have	to	be	treated	as	strictly	true	if	Alberto	happens	to	satisfy	
a	 number	 of	 features	 associated	 with	 the	 slur,	 which,	 according	 to	
Croom,	include	features	such	as	“x	is	a	Mexican-American”	or	“x	is	a	
foreign	worker	or	 exchange	 student	with	 a	 thick	non-native	 accent”	
(Croom,	2014b,	p.	162).	The	essentialist	account	differs	from	Croom’s	
insofar	as	what	 is	decisive	 for	 the	successful	 reference	of	 the	slur	 is	
whether	 the	 target	possesses	 some	 intrinsic	 “Latino	essence”,	which	
slur	users	take	to	unify	all	 ‘spics’,	that	disposes	them	to	exhibit	nega-
tive	traits.	Thus,	(18)	will	be	false	even	if	Alberto	happens	to	exhibit	a	
number	of	 features	corresponding	with	the	stereotype.	Again,	while	
these	accounts	might	be	able	to	appeal	to	explanations	that	lie	outside	
the	domain	of	their	theories	to	explain	our	falsehood	and	referential	
intuitions	about	slurs	away,34	the	essentialist	theory	accounts	for	them	
directly.
The	null-extension	consequence	of	my	view	also	gives	us	 the	 re-
sources	to	deal	with	a	species	of	NDNA	uses	of	slurs	that	can	be	clas-
sified	as	“metalinguistic	denial”:
(19)	“There	are	no	chinks	at	my	university,	there	are	only	
Chinese	people.”
Take	this	sentence	to	be	uttered	by	a	non-racist	who,	upon	hearing	(12),	
intends	to	express	that	the	slur	does	not	apply	to	Chinese	people	at	
the	university,	while	‘Chinese’	does.	The	question	is	how	a	non-racist	
person	could	a)	negate	the	slur	predicate	while	applying	the	‘Chinese’	
34.	 For	 such	 a	 strategy,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Anderson	 and	 Lepore	 (2013);	 Camp	 (2018);	
Jeshion	(2013b);	or	Whiting	(2013).
group	membership	in	non-accidental	ways	to	negative	properties	that	
emerge	from	the	oppression.	Since	the	oppressive	forces	converge	on	
individuals	because	they	are	taken	to	be	members	of	 the	group,	the	
connection	 is	 causal.	 Since	membership	 in	 the	 socially	 constructed	
kind	is	in	part	a	question	of	whether	one	is	taken	to	be	or	treated	as	a	
member	of	that	kind,	the	causal	connection	is	through	group	member-
ship.	If	that	is	the	case,	the	conditions	specified	by	a	slur	might	some-
times	be	satisfied	and	the	slur	can	successfully	refer.	This	is	an	impor-
tant	 objection	 to	 the	null-extension	hypothesis.	 In	 response,	 I	want	
to	highlight	certain	assumptions	that	constrain	our	representations	of	
“essences”:	We	see	them	as	internal and	intrinsic to	the	subject;	a	class	
of	subjects	cannot	possess	an	essence	relationally.	As	Haslanger	(2011)	
puts	it	for	the	case	of	generics:	
[Generics	license	the	inference	that]	the	fact	in	question	
obtains	 by	 virtue	 of	 something	 specifically about the sub-
ject so described,	 i.e.,	about	women,	or	blacks,	or	sagging	
pants.	In	the	examples	I’ve	offered,	however,	this	implica-
tion	is	unwarranted.	The	facts	 in	question	obtain	by	vir-
tue	of	broad	system	of	social	relations	within	which	the	
subjects	are	situated,	and	are	not	grounded	in	intrinsic or 
dispositional features of the subjects themselves.	(my	empha-
sis,	Haslanger,	2011,	p.	446)
Similarly,	the	causal	element	of	slurs	presupposes	that	the	essence	is	
intrinsic,	not	extrinsic,	to	the	subject.	Since	this	condition	is	not	satis-
fied	in	the	cases	I’m	discussing,	slurs	don’t	have	extension.
In	contrast	to	my	account,	many	other	accounts,	such	as	Anderson	
and	Lepore’s	minimalist	and	Jeshion’s	expressivist	accounts,	are	com-
mitted	to	the	view	that	the	sentences	in	(15)–(17)	are	true.	But	also	ac-
counts	that	lie	closer	to	the	account	I	propose	here	differ	in	the	predic-
tions	they	make	about	slurs’	reference	and,	correspondingly,	the	truth	
of	sentences	containing	slurs.	Consider	Croom’s	family	resemblance	
view	of	slurs	(Croom,	2011;	2015).	According	to	him,	slurs	encode	a	
set	 of	 negatively-valenced	weighted	 features.	 If	 a	 person	 P	 satisfies	
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(21)	All	mermaids	live	in	Ohio.
(22)	Every	unicorn	admires	Noam	Chomsky.
(23)	All	phlogiston	is	located	in	the	Pacific	Ocean.
If	you	agree	with	the	position	that	quantifiers	come	with	lexical	exis-
tential	presuppositions,	then	(20)	will	come	out	as	false	or	truth-value-
less.	If	you	don’t	agree	with	it,	(20)	will	come	out	as	trivially	true,	but	
so	will	(21)–(23)	—	which	doesn’t	lead	anyone	to	worry	about	whether	
‘mermaid’,	‘unicorn’,	or	‘phlogiston’	in	fact	have	an	extension.	In	short,	
the	objection	doesn’t	pose	any	problem	for	null-extensionality	views	
of	slurs. 
(6) Derogatory Projection
Importantly,	 although	 slurs	 have	 null-extension,	 uses	 of	 slurs	 still	
carry	an	existential presupposition.	Slur	users	presuppose	that	there are 
individuals	that	fall	under	the	extension	of	the	slurs	they	use.37	This	
accounts	for	a	peculiar,	well-known	fact	about	slurs’	projection	behav-
ior:	Their	derogatory	effect	persists	in	various	compositional	contexts,	
such	 as	 negations,	 conditionals,	modals,	 or	 questions	 (Anderson	&	
Lepore,	 2013;	 Bolinger,	 2017;	 Camp,	 2013;	 2018;	 Cepollaro	&	 Stoja-
novic,	2016;	Hom,	2010;	Jeshion,	2013b).	
(24)	“He’s	not	a	kike,	he’s	a	Muslim.”
(25)	“How	many	chinks	are	at	the	University	of	Southern	
California?”
(26)	“If	he’s	a	wop,	I	won’t	date	him.”
(27)	 “She’s	 so	 bad	 with	 the	 wand,	 she	 might	 be	 a	
mudblood.”
37.	 The	existential	presupposition	is	(arguably)	not	triggered	in	instances	of	met-
alinguistic	denial,	as	in	(19)	or	in	cases	of	negative	existentials	in	contexts	of	
the	type:	“He	isn’t	a	chink;	no	one	is.”
predicate,	 and,	again,	b)	do	 so	without	derogation.35	My	 framework	
predicts	that	(19)	has	these	properties.	The	non-racist	and	properly	in-
formed	person	rejects	the	causal	connection	between	a	“Chineseness	
essence”	and	the	negative	stereotypical	properties	encoded	in	the	slur.	
She	rightly	thinks	that	nothing is	in	the	extension	of	‘chink’:	It	is	true	of	
nobody	that	they	have	a	“Chineseness”	nature	that	causally	disposes	
them	to	manifest	negative	stereotypical	features	associated	with	being	
Chinese.	By	asserting	the	first	conjunct	of	(19),	she	just	rejects	what	
she	correctly	believes	to	be	false.	Since	the	speaker	of	(19)	expresses	
that	Chinese	people	don’t	fall	under	the	extension	of	the	slur	(since	
no	one	does),	we	can	also	classify	(19)	as	an	instance	of	metalinguistic	
denial.
Before	moving	on,	I	will	address	an	objection	that	Sennet	and	Copp	
(2015)	raise	against	the	null-extensionality	thesis	as	defended	in	Hom	
and	May	(2015).	If	successful,	it	would	also	apply	to	my	version	of	the	
thesis.	Fortunately,	 it	 isn’t.	Their	charge	is	that	null-extensionality	of	
slurs	entails	that	sentences	of	the	following	kind	are	trivially	true:
(20)	“All	kikes	are	Mormons.”
But,	contra	null-extensionality,	Sennet	and	Copp	remark	that	(20)	is	
intuitively	false.	
A	 standard	 position	 in	 formal	 semantics	 is	 that	we	 should	 intro-
duce	an	existential	domain	condition	(in	other	words,	a	lexical existen-
tial presupposition)	 to	our	 semantics	 for	universal	quantifiers,36	 since	
this	would	increase	the	descriptive	accuracy	of	our	theory	of	quantifi-
ers	with	respect	to	sentences	like	(21)–(23),	which	would	all	come	out	
as	trivially	true	without	such	a	condition.
35.	 See	fn.	32.
36.	See,	e.g.,	Diesing	(1992),	McCawley	(1972),	Strawson	(1963).	See	Heim	and	
Kratzer	(1998,	ch.	6)	for	an	introductory	overview	of	the	debate.	The	lexical	
entry	of	‘all’	would	change	to	 	Note	that	there	is	
no	controversy	about	whether	sentences	like	(21)–(23)	introduce	some exis-
tential	presupposition.	The	question	is	whether	it	is	to	be	located	lexically	or	
pragmatically.
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nothing	is	in	the	extension	of	slurs,	the	informed	speaker	is	licensed	to	
respond	with	a	denial	of	the	presupposed	content.39 
(7) Derogatory Variation
Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 last	 explanandum	 on	 our	 list.	 It	 is	 widely	
thought	that	some	pejoratives	are	more	powerful	in	their	disparaging	
and	derogating	 force	 than	others,	 a	phenomenon	 that	 is	 standardly	
listed	as	a	central	explanatory	desideratum	for	 theories	of	slurs	(An-
derson	&	Lepore,	2013;	Bolinger,	2017;	Hom,	2008;	2010).	Compare,	
for	example,	the	difference	in	offensiveness	between	the	N-word	and	
‘limey’	—	the	former	 is	substantially	stronger	 in	 its	derogatory	effects	
than	the	latter.	The	same	goes	for	 ‘chink’	vs.	 ‘kraut’,	 ‘kike’	vs.	 ‘honky’,	
‘wog’	vs.	‘yank’,	and	so	on.40	Furthermore,	the	derogatory	content	of	a	
slur	can	vary	as	a	function	of	time:	The	derogatory	force	of	‘kraut’	or	
‘commie’,	 for	 instance,	was	 substantially	 stronger	during	 the	 time	of	
World	War	II	and	the	Cold	War,	respectively,	than	it	is	now.	
Many	theories	contend	that	the	difference	in	encoded	negative	atti-
tudes	or	negative	descriptive	information	is	what	accounts	for	the	fact	
that	slurs	differ	in	their	derogatory	strength.41 Prima facie,	this	explana-
tion	seems	very	plausible.	For	example,	we	often	find	that	powerful	
slurs	are	also	associated	with	very	negative	stereotypes.	Most	would	
agree	that	the	social	stereotypes	associated	with	white	people	(‘hon-
ky’)	are	less	negatively	valenced	than	the	stereotypes	associated	with	
people	of	Chinese	ethnicity	(‘chink’),	which	in	turn	are	less	negative	
than	the	ones	associated	with	black	persons	(N-word).42	And	knowing	
39.	Correspondingly,	our	earlier	example	(19)	would	be	an	appropriate	answer	
to	the	question	asked	in	(25),	as	it	expresses	refusal	to	accept	the	existential	
presupposition	that	the	speaker	introduces	by	its	utterance.
40.	See	Mullen	and	Leader	(2005)	and	Rice	et	al.	(2010)	for	an	empirical	quanti-
fication	of	these	differences.	
41.	 That	holds	true	especially	of	views	that	are	close	to	the	view	I	advocate	here	
(e.g.,	Croom,	2011;	Hom,	2008),	but	is	also	a	move	open	to	expressivist	views.
42.	 For	an	empirical	quantification	of	 the	negative	stereotypes	associated	with	
some	 of	 the	 social	 groups	 referenced	 in	 this	 paper,	 see,	 e.g.,	 Bessenoff	&	
Sherman	(2000);	Copping	et	al.	(2013);	Cvencek,	Meltzoff,	and	Greenwald	
Take,	as	an	example,	(24).	Although	the	speaker	does	not attribute	a	
“Jewish	 essence”	 to	 the	 object	 of	 discourse,	 (24)	 clearly	 stays	 an	 in-
stance	of	derogatory	slur	usage.	Why?
Usually,	 when	 we	 introduce	 entities	 into	 a	 discourse	 by	 talking	
about	them,	we	signal	to	our	interlocutors	that	we	take	their	existence	
for	granted:
(28)	Do	you	prefer	cats	or	dogs?
(29)	This	isn’t	silver,	it’s	stainless	steel.
(30)	If	that’s	lemonade,	I	want	it.
(31)	The	woman	we	met	yesterday	was	so	eloquent,	she	
might	be	an	English	professor.
Uttering	(28)–(31)	presupposes	that	you	believe	that	there	are	cats,	sil-
ver,	 lemonade,	 or	 English	 professors.	Analogously,	 utterance	 of	 any	
sentence	in	(24)–(27)	is	only	felicitous	if	the	speaker	presupposes	that	
there	are	objects	in	our	domain	the	slurs	apply	to.	But	presupposing,	
like	 the	 speaker	does	 in	 (24),	 that	 there	 is	 something	 like	a	 “Jewish	
essence”,	carried	predominantly	by	Jewish	people	that	causally	predis-
poses	them	to	exhibit	negative	features,	of	course	dehumanizes	and	
derogates	the	entire	group	of	Jews.38	This	explains	why	the	derogatori-
ness	of	slurs	persists	even	if	the	speaker	does	not	assertively	predicate	
a	causally	potent	essence	 to	a	discourse	object.	And	since	 in	 reality,	
38.	Note	that	we	can	successfully	apply	the	well-known	“wait	a	minute”	test	to	
(24)–(27),	 revealing	 the	 existential	 presuppositions	 triggered	 by	 the	 exam-
ples.	This	test	is	standardly	employed	to	test	the	presuppositions	triggered	by	
a	sentence	(von	Fintel,	2009).	Consider,
	 	 (32)	Stephen	stopped	smoking.	
	 The	“wait	a	minute”	test	reveals	that	(32)	presupposes	that	Stephen	smoked.	
If	I	am	not	willing	to	accommodate	the	common	ground	appropriately—be-
cause	I	 think	that	Stephen	never	smoked—I	can	felicitously	respond:	“Wait	
a	minute—Stephen	never	smoked!”	Similarly,	 “Wait	a	minute—there	are	no	
kikes!”	conveys	the	refusal	to	accommodate	the	common	ground	as	required	
by	the	existential	presupposition.	
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their	race,	sexuality,	gender,	or	ethnicity	—	are	the	ones	which,	in	addi-
tion	to	encoding	profoundly	negative	stereotypes,	are	highly essential-
ized.	In	each	case,	the	slur	expresses	that	it	is	in	someone’s	very nature 
to	have	features	that	are	bad.	And	while	knowing	that	you	think	badly	
of	me	hurts,	knowing	that	you	think	badly	of	me	because	of	something	
in	my	intrinsic,	inescapable	nature	is	deep.	What	I	do	and	who	I	am	is	
not	seen	as	a	matter	of	my	individual	choices	and	agency,	but	as	a	deep	
matter	of	my	nature.	This	is	what	it	means	to	dehumanize.
Let	us	go	in	more	detail	through	my	semantic	model	and	the	way	
it	explains	 the	data.	 I	maintain	 that	 the	derogatory	 force	of	a	slur	 is	
a	direct	offspring	of	 its	 semantics,	where	 the	essence	and	 the	 set	of	
negative	features	are	the	determining	factors	of	a	slur’s	meaning.	The	
derogatory	strength	of	a	slur	therefore	is	a	function	of	these	elements.	
The	more	negative	the	represented	stereotype	of	a	group	is,	the	more	
demeaning	the	corresponding	slur	should	come	out.45	The	more	a	cat-
egory	is	essentialized,	the	stronger	the	diminishing	effects	of	the	slur	
should	be.	When	the	two	of	them	come	together,	the	derogatory	force	
of	slurs	is	explosive.46	Thus,	holding	the	level	of	essentialism	(largely)	
fixed,	slurs	for	groups	with	stronger	negative	stereotypes	are	more	de-
rogatory.	Holding	the	degree	of	negative	stereotyping	fixed,	slurs	for	
groups	which	are	more	essentialized	will	be	more	derogatory.47	When	
45.	 Of	course,	the	represented	stereotype	must	also	conventionally govern	the	slur	
in	question.	However,	we	can	say	that	our	representation	of	the	stereotype	
of	the	social	group	most	associated	with	the	slur	is	a	rough	measure	of	the	
stereotype	convention	that	governs	the	slur.
46.	 Interestingly,	high	level	of	essentialism	towards	a	social	group	has	often	been	
found	to	predict	negative	stereotyping	and	prejudice	(see	Bastian	&	Haslam,	
2006;	 Haslam	&  Ernst,	 2002;	 Haslam	&  Levy,	 2006;	 Howell,	Weikum,	&	
Dyck,	2011;	Levy	&	Dweck,	1999;	Pauker	et	al.,	2010;	Prentice	& Miller,	2007;	
Williams	&	Eberhardt,	2008).	See	also	Leslie	(2017)	for	a	discussion	of	our	
tendency	to	attribute	features	to	an	essence	of	a	basic-level	category	when	
these	features	are	negative.
47.	 These	 comparisons	 are	 not	 completely	 clean—it	 proves	 hard	 to	 keep	 the	
essentialist	 or	 stereotype	 dimensions	 fixed	 when	 making	 comparisons.	 It	
is	 very	plausible,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 social	 category	of	 communists	was	
more	essentialized	during	the	Cold	War	than	it	 is	now.	Similarly,	although	
“race”	 receives	 generally	 the	 highest	 essentialism	 ratings,	 essentialism	 for	
that	 others	 think	 ill	 of	 or	harbor	negative	 attitudes	 against	 us	hurts.	
This	is	true	even	when	the	agents	that	harbor	these	attitudes	are	not	
significant	to	us.	Imagine	you	notice	how	a	bunch	of	teenagers	in	the	
subway	are	snickering,	making	it	obvious	that	you	are	the	source	of	
their	 amusement.	 These	 teenagers	 are	 complete	 strangers,	 and	 you	
will	 never	 see	 them	again.	You	 know	 that	whether	 these	 teenagers	
think	well	of	you	or	not	has	no	impact	whatsoever	on	anything	you	
take	to	matter	 in	your	 life.	Still,	 their	snicker	hurts.43	Naturally,	 then,	
stronger	negative	attitudes	will	hurt	more,	and	weaker	negative	atti-
tudes	will	hurt	less.
However,	 this	explanation	can’t	be	 the	entire	story.	 It	misses	out	
on	a	general,	systematic	pattern	of	how	the	derogatory	force	of	differ-
ent	slurs	varies.	Why	is	it	that	in	general,	slurs	that	target	someone	on	
the	basis	of	their	race,	ethnicity,	gender,	or	sexuality	are	particularly	
toxic?44	It	is	hard	to	imagine	a	slur	targeting	fans	of,	say,	an	opposing	
football	team	to	possibly	be	more	derogatory	than	slurs	such	as	‘faggot’	
or	‘kike’	—	even	if	the	properties	associated	with	these	fans	were	highly	
negative.	By	the	same	token,	these	slurs	seem	to	be	more	diminishing	
than	‘lardass’,	‘libtard’,	or	‘junkie’,	although	the	corresponding	groups	
are,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 users,	 associated	with	 highly	 nega-
tive	stereotypes.	Theories	 that	 solely	 rely	on	differences	 in	negative	
attitudes	or	descriptive	information	can’t	account	for	this	fine-grained	
pattern	of	the	data.
The	essentialist	 theory	captures	 this	 subtle	pattern.	The	slurs	we	
find	particularly	 toxic	—	the	ones	 targeting	 someone	on	 the	basis	of	
(2011);	Cvencek	et	al.	(2015);	Devine	(1989);	Dovidio,	Evans,	and	Tyler	(1986);	
Eberhardt	et	al.	(2004);	Gaertner	and	McLaughlin	(1983);	Goff	et	al.	(2008);	
Wang,	 Brownell,	 and	 Wadden	 (2004);	 Woods,	 Kurtz-Costes,	 and	 Rowley	
(2005).
43.	 The	example	is	based	on	an	example	used	in	Bero	(2017).
44.	 In	a	similar	vein,	Popa-Wyatt	asks	in	her	2016	paper:	“Is	it	coincidence	that	
many	of	the	most	offensive	slur	words	are	associated	with	groups	we	might	
identify	as	oppressed?”	(Popa-Wyatt,	2016,	p.	155).	My	answer	to	that	question	
is	“no”:	group	essentialism	is	the	key	variable	explaining	both	group	oppres-
sion	and	the	derogatory	potential	encoded	in	slurs	(see	Appiah,	2018;	Leslie,	
2017;	Livingstone	Smith,	2011).
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bring	to	our	minds	the	slurs	that	are	the	derogatorily	deepest,	we	will	
directly	see	that	they	fall	under	one	of	those	social	categories.
Note	also	that	the	essentialist	theory	gives	us	a	natural	way	to	ac-
commodate	 the	 theoretical	 difficulty	 of	 finding	 a	 clear	 demarcating	
criterion	 distinguishing	 slurs	 from	 non-slurs.	 Many	 theorists	 draw	
a	distinction	between	slurs,	which	 target	 individuals	based	on	 their	
membership	 in	 a	group,	 and	 individual	pejoratives,	which	 target	 in-
dividuals	based	on	some	(temporary)	behavior	or	“personal	qualities”.	
While	everyone	can	point	at	paradigmatic	examples	of	slurs,	and	par-
adigmatic	 cases	of	 individual	pejoratives	 (‘jerk’,	 ‘asshole’,	 ‘dickhead’),	
and	most	 feel	 the	 intuitive	pull	 to	 theoretically	distinguish	between	
these	two	classes	(although	see	Jeshion,	2013a	for	a	criticism	of	this	
distinction),	there	are	many	pejorative	terms	that	have	proven	to	be	
quite	difficult	to	classify	in	one	way	or	the	other.	Consider,
(33)	“Hey	fatso!”
Popa-Wyatt	 (2016)	notices	 that	 (33)	—	like	 ‘lardass’,	 ‘druggie’,	 ‘junkie’,	
‘bum’,	or	‘commie’	—	
sits	in	the	middle	ground	between	[slurs]	and	[individual	
pejoratives]	[…].	Like	pejoratives	targeted	at	individuals,	
they	identify	the	targeted	individual	on	the	basis	of	spe-
cific	properties	that	s/he	has.	But	like	slurs,	they	express	
contempt	 not	 only	 about	 the	 particular	 individual	 but	
also	about	other	people	who	have	similar	 features,	and	
so	may	be	identified	as	part	of	a	group.	(p.	152)
Essentialism	about	slurs	explains	why	it	is	difficult	to	find	a	clear	line	
distinguishing	slurs	 from	 individual	pejoratives.	 Just	as	essentialism	
ratings	are	on	a	continuum,	our	judgements	about	whether	something	
is	a	slur	or	not	will	be	on	a	continuum,	rather	than	an	all-or-nothing	
affair.	 People	 are	 less	 sure	 about	whether	 people	with	 higher	 body	
weight	or	communist	attitudes	are	describable	by	having	some	“group	
prejudice	 and	 negative	 stereotyping	 towards	 groups	 such	 as	 homosexuals	
(Haslam	&	Levy,	2006).
a	category	is	both strongly	essentialized	and	the	associated	stereotypes	
are	highly	negative,	the	diminishing	force	of	a	slur	culminates.
While	it	is	evident	that	the	negative	stereotypes	we	associate	with	
a	 group	 can	 be	more	 or	 less	 pronounced,	 it	 has	 also	 long	 been	 es-
tablished	that	there	are	differences	in	the	degrees	to	which	we	essen-
tialize	social	groups.	In	an	important	study,	Nick	Haslam	and	his	col-
leagues	(2000)	developed	a	set	of	questions	that	assessed	different	di-
mensions	along	which	we	essentialize	groups.	Specifically,	they	tested	
whether	participants	essentialized	social	groups	along	the	dimensions	
of	 naturalness,	 stability,	 discreteness	 of	 category	 boundaries,	 immu-
tability	of	category	membership,	and	necessity	of	category	features.48 
Within	the	40	social	categories	that	were	rated,49	the	categories	of	gen-
der, ethnicity, and race	as	well	as	Jews and	homosexuals received	particu-
larly	high	ratings,	and	the	categories	associated	with	interests,	politics,	
appearance,	and	social	class	received	the	lowest	ratings.50	And	if	we	
the	category	“black”	 is	still	more	marked	than	essentialism	for	“white”	(see	
Haslam	et	al.,	2000).
48.	 They	 took	 these	 to	be	 the	dimensions	 “that	are	commonly	 invoked	 in	psy-
chological,	philosophical	and	social	scientific	writings”	(Haslam	et	al.,	2000,	
p.	117).	In	the	study,	they	asked	participants	to	rate,	on	a	scale	from	1	to	9,	to	
which	extent	one	of	the	listed	dimensions	applies	to	a	category.	The	dimen-
sion	of	discreteness,	for	example,	was	described	to	the	participants	as	follows:	
“[s]ome	categories	have	sharper	boundaries	than	others.	For	some,	member-
ship	is	clear-cut,	definite,	and	of	an	‘either/or’	variety;	people	either	belong	to	
the	category	or	they	do	not.	For	others,	membership	is	more	‘fuzzy’;	people	
belong	to	the	category	in	varying	degrees.”	To	give	another	example,	the	di-
mension	of	naturalness	was	described	to	the	participants	as	“some	categories	
are	more	natural	than	others,	whereas	others	are	more	artificial”.
49.	 The	aim	of	 the	 study	was	 to	 cover	as	many	categories	as	possible;	 among	
many	others,	some	of	the	assessed	categories	were,	e.g.,	diseases	(AIDS	pa-
tients,	cancer	patients),	dietary	groups	(meat	eaters,	vegetarians),	intelligence	
groups	 (smart	people,	people	of	 average	 intelligence),	 races	 (black,	white),	
religions	(Catholics,	Jews),	political	groups	(liberals,	Republicans).
50.	It	is	important	to	clarify	that	the	categories	Jews and	homosexuals	received	ex-
tremely	high	ratings	for	dimensions	that	Haslam	et	al.	describe	as	indexing	
a	group’s	entitativity.	Entitativity	is	a	subtype	of	our	general	essentialist	bias,	
and	can	be	described	as	the	belief	that	members	of	a	group	are	very	similar	to	
one	another,	such	that	membership	in	a	group	is	very	informative	about	the	
nature	of	its	members.	Essentialism,	as	entitativity,	has	been	found	to	predict	
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structured	in	an	essentialist	way,	and	(2)	slurs	are	uniquely	associated	
with	negative	stereotypes.	
Let	us	start	with	component	(1).	Through	a	number	of	well-estab-
lished	 psychological	 paradigms,	 cognitive	 psychologists	 have	 docu-
mented	 that	 certain	 categories	—	especially	 natural	 kind	 categories	
such	as	animals,	minerals,	and	chemicals	—	are	cognitively	represented	
in	a	highly	essentialized	way.	We	act	as	if	members	of	certain	catego-
ries	have	immutable,	enduring,	and	natural	essences	which	make	them	
what	they	are	(for	an	overview,	see	Gelman,	2003;	2004).	Furthermore,	
as	we	have	 already	 seen	 in	 the	 last	 section,	we	now	know	 that	we	
also	think	of	many	human	or	social categories in	this	exact	same,	highly	
essentialized,	way.51	More	 concretely,	we	behave	 as	 if	 social	 groups	
are	 real kinds:	 They	 have	 sharp	 category	 boundaries,	 are	 somewhat	
“natural”,	historically	stable,	“real”	and	not	constructed,	and	allow	for	
rich	inductive	inferences	about	physical	and	behavioral	traits	of	their	
members.52	In	particular,	social	categories	such	as	race	and	ethnicity	
(Allport,	1954;	Gil‐White,	2001;	Haslam	et	al.,	2000;	Hirschfeld,	1996;	
Ho,	Roberts,	&	Gelman,	2015;	Pauker	et	al.,	 2016;	Verkuyten,	2003),	
gender	(Gelman,	2003;	Gelman,	Collman,	&	Maccoby,	1986;	Prentice	
51.	 There	 is	wide-ranging	evidence	that	we	hold	essentialist	beliefs	 from	early	
childhood	on,	which	has	been	documented	by	psychologists—prominently,	
Susan	 A.	 Gelman—throughout	 the	 past	 30	 years.	 For	 example,	 preschool	
children	believe	 that	a	baby	kangaroo	raised	among	goats	will	grow	up	 to	
hop	and	have	a	pouch	(Gelman	&	Wellman,	1991;	cf.	Gelman,	2003).	They	
also	expect	 that	something	that	has	turtle	 insides	will	still	be	a	turtle	even	
if	 it	doesn’t	 look	 like	one	(Gelman	&	Wellman,	1991),	suggesting	that	 they	
don’t	rely	on	observable	surface	features	to	determine	kind	membership.	For	
our	tendency	to	essentialize	social	categories,	see,	e.g.,	Gelman	(2003);	Gil‐
White	(2001);	Haslam	(2000)	Haslam	&	Levy	(2006);	Haslam	et	al.	(2000);	
Hirschfeld	 (1995;	 1996);	 Prentice	&	Miller,	 (2007).	 For	 a	 general	 overview	
of	 the	evidence	tracking	children’s	essentialist	belief	structure,	see	Gelman	
(2003).	
52.	 See,	e.g.,	Demoulin,	Leyens,	&	Yzerbyt	(2006);	Gelman	(2003);	Haslam	et	
al.	(2000).	It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	these	markers	are	characteristic 
features	 of	our	 representation	of	 essences,	 and	do	not	 constitute	necessary	
conditions	for	something	to	be	represented	as	an	essence.	This	conception	
of	essences	also	doesn’t	completely	correspond	to	the	philosopher’s	as	“that	
intrinsic	aspect	of	a	thing	that	grounds	all	and	only	the	intrinsic	metaphysical	
necessities	that	hold	of	the	thing”	(Leslie,	2017,	p.	406).	
essence”	 that	determines	 their	behavior,	 traits,	 and	unifies	 them,	or	
whether	 they	 should	be	characterized	 simply	as	having	mutable,	 in-
dividual	properties.	Hence,	 in	 these	cases,	subjects	will	be	reluctant,	
unsure,	or	 in	disagreement	about	whether	 to	call	a	 term	 ‘slur’	or	an	
‘individual	pejorative’,	just	as	predicted	by	the	essentialist	theory.	
In	 sum,	 theories	 that	 appeal	 to	 differences	 between	 descriptive	
or	 expressive	 attitudes	 towards	 different	 social	 groups	 only	 can	 ac-
count	for	derogatory	variation	if	we	carve	up	the	data	in	a	very	coarse-
grained,	one-dimensional	way.	To	account	 for	 the	subtle	pattern	we	
find	in	the	data,	we	need	another	parameter.	The	essentialist	theory	
delivers	this	level	by	adding	another	dimension	to	the	derogatory	po-
tential	of	a	slur:	The	derogatory	force	of	a	slur	is	a	function	not	only	
of	the	negative	stereotypes	it	encodes,	but	its	stereotypes	and the	de-
gree	to	which	it	essentializes.	The	essentialist	theory,	then,	uniquely	
captures	the	systematic	pattern	we	find	in	the	data	and	explains	why	
slurs	that	are	particularly	deep	in	their	offensiveness	tend	to	fall	under	
specific	categories;	categories	that	are	strongly	essentialized.
§3 Slurs and the Psychology of Social Kinds
3.1 Experimental Evidence for the Essentialist Theory
Thus	far,	I	have	motivated	my	theory	by	showing	that	an	essentialist	
semantics	for	slurs	can	account	for	their	main	linguistic	properties.	I	
now	present	converging	evidence	from	cognitive	psychology	for	the	
existence	of	the	cognitive	structures	postulated	by	my	theory	of	slurs.	
As	I	indicated	earlier,	I	here	assume	an	intimate	link	between	linguis-
tic	meaning	and	mental	concepts.	More	specifically,	according	to	the	
background	view	I	take	for	granted	in	this	paper,	terms	inherit	their	
linguistic	meaning	 directly	 from	 internally	 individuated	 lexical	 con-
cepts,	which	I	understand	as	the	smallest	constituents	of	thought	and	
primary	bearers	of	meaning.	From	this	perspective,	studying	the	struc-
ture	and	information	encoded	in	lexical	concepts	can	directly	inform	
our	semantic	theory.	We	will	review	evidence	in	favor	of	the	two	cen-
tral	components	of	my	essentialist	analysis:	(1)	Slurs	are	semantically	
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psychologists	 for	 the	past	30	years.	 If	we	take	these	findings	at	 face	
value,	we	must,	 in	 any	 case,	 accept	 that	many	 social	 concepts	have	
an	essentialist	structure.	Accordingly,	 to	assume	that	also	slur	terms	
are	associated	with	essentialistically	 structured	 concepts	 is	not	only	
descriptively	plausible	but	also	theoretically	parsimonious.
Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 second	 key	 component	 of	my	 semantics,	
namely,	 that	 slurs	encode	negatively	valenced	 stereotypes.	Recently,	
the	 phenomenon	 of	 slurring	 language	 has	 begun	 to	 be	 empirically	
investigated	by	psycholinguists.	These	studies	revealed	that	slurs,	in	
contrast	 to	 their	 neutral	 counterpart	 terms,	 are	 uniquely associated	
with	negative	features.	Since	these	studies	used	implicit	paradigms	in	
some	of	their	studies,	we	have	good	reasons	to	think	that	these	nega-
tive	features	belong	to	the	semantic representation	of	slurs.55
In	an	experiment	using	a	free	association	paradigm,	Carnaghi	and	
Maass	(2008)	delivered	primary	evidence	for	the	negative	stereotypes	
encoded	in	slurs.	They	presented	participants	with	derogatory	words	
(‘fag’)	or	their	neutral	counterparts	(‘gay’).	When	presented	with	the	
slurs,	the	first	three	words	participants	mentioned	were	significantly	
more	 negatively-valenced	 than	 when	 presented	 with	 their	 neutral	
counterparts.	However,	 since	 this	 experiment	 used	 an	 explicit	 para-
digm,	we	cannot	make	strong	inferences	about	the	semantic	structure	
of	slurs	on	the	basis	of	it.56	For	this	reason,	in	a	follow	up	study,	Carnaghi	
55.	 There	 are	many	ways	 to	 carve	up	 the	 semantics-pragmatics	 distinction.	 In	
this	 paper,	 I	 assume	 the	 psychology-based	 framework	 according	 to	which	
semantics	 includes	 those	representations	 that	enter	 into	and	are	 the	result	
of	 immediate	 composition	 by	 our	 linguistic	 competence,	 and	 pragmatics	
includes	 all	 post-compositional	 representations	 that	 have	 been	 subject	 to	
general	reasoning	processing	from	central	cognition.
56.	The	most	 important	 limitation	of	 explicit	 tasks	 is	 that	 they	do	not	 impose	
any	constraints	controlling	for	response	modifications	by	conscious	reason-
ing	 and	 voluntary	 control.	 For	 example,	 the	 negative	 association	 could	 as	
well	be	a	post-semantic,	pragmatic-inferential	phenomenon	and	would	thus	
not	 constitute	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 stereotypes	 are	 se-
mantically	encoded	 in	 slurs.	To	 reveal	 the	 “bare”	 linguistic	 representations	
behind	slurring	words,	it	is	more	appropriate	to	employ	a	paradigm	whose	
task	outcomes	are	not	influenced	or	distorted	by	other	non-semantic	cogni-
tive	operations.	Implicit	tasks	are	ideal	to	unveil	the	semantic	representations	
behind	slurring	words,	since	their	task	outcomes	are	less	prone	to	be	a	result	
&	Miller,	2006;	2007),	caste	(Mahalingam,	2003),	sexual	orientation	
(Haslam	&	Levy,	2006),	religion	(Chalik,	Leslie,	&	Rhodes,	2017;	Toosi	
&	Ambady,	2011),	and	mental	illness	(Haslam,	2000;	Haslam	&	Ernst,	
2002;	Howell,	Weikum,	&	Dyck,	2011)	—	in	short,	the	categories	that	
are	central	to	human	slurring	practices	—	have	been	found	to	be	cogni-
tively	represented	in	a	highly	essentialized	way.53
For	illustration,	consider	the	case	of	race:	This	category	is	certainly	
among	the	most	relevant	for	slurs,	given	both	the	prevalence	and	deep	
offensiveness	of	epithets	that	target	subjects	on	the	basis	of	their	race.	
In	a	series	of	pivotal	experiments,	psychologist	Lawrence	Hirschfeld	
documented	essentialist	 thinking	about	 race	 in	both	adults	and	pre-
schoolers	 as	 young	 as	 three	 years	 (Hirschfeld,	 1995;	 1996;	 see	 also	
Pauker	et	al.,	2010).	In	one	paradigm,	he	asked	preschoolers	whether	
a	 racial	property	class	—	hair	and	skin	color	—	or	a	physical	property	
class	—	clothing	style	and	color	—	would	remain	unchanged	as	a	per-
son	grows	up.	Even	3-year-olds	judged	that	the	properties	connected	
with	race	were	more	constant	than	sartorial	properties.54	He	obtained	
the	 same	 preference	 for	 race	 as	 the	 dominant	 factor	 compared	 to	
other	 physical	 features	 for	 inheritance	 judgements:	When	 children	
were	 asked	which	 properties	 they	would	 inherit	 from	 their	 parents,	
they	 predominantly	 picked	 racial	 properties.	 In	 a	 switched-at-birth	
paradigm,	children	were	asked	which	racial	properties	a	child	that	was	
adopted	by	parents	of	another	skin	color	would	develop.	5-year-olds	
outweighingly	decided	in	favor	of	the	birth	parents’	racial	properties	
(Hirschfeld,	1996).
To	 sum	 up,	 reasoning	 about	 social	 categories	 follows	 typical	 es-
sentialist	dimensions	already	in	early	childhood.	Thus,	my	proposed	
structure	 of	 slurs	 neatly	 corresponds	 to	 the	 essentialist	 structure	 of	
social	categories	that	has	been	systematically	uncovered	by	cognitive	
53.	 See	also	Prentice	and	Miller	(2007)	for	an	overview.
54.	 This	effect	can’t	be	accounted	for	by	the	explanation	that	children	represent	
body	features	as	more	stable	than	non-body	features.	When	4-years	olds	were	
asked	to	choose	whether	body	build	vs.	hair	and	skin	color	would	remain	the	
same	over	life	span,	they	too	judged	significantly	more	often	in	favor	of	racial	
properties.
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which	confirms,	experimentally,	that	there	is	a	major	semantic	differ-
ence	 between	 neutral	 category	 labels	 and	 their	 corresponding	 epi-
thets.	In	similar	vein,	the	authors	of	the	studies	conclude	that
[t]ogether,	these	results	suggest	that	derogatory	group	la-
bels	differ	from	category	group	labels	mainly	with	respect	
to	 the	valence	of	 the	associations	 they	elicit.	Thus,	 it	 is	
not	so	much	the	ability	to	activate	stereotypical	content	
than	the	tendency	to	activate	less-flattering	associations	
that	distinguishes	derogatory	from	category	group	labels.	
(Carnaghi	& Maass,	2007,	p. 147)
We	 saw	 in	 the	 last	 section	 that	my	view	explains	 the	 central	 lin-
guistic	 data	 involving	 slurs,	 and	 I	 have	 now	 shown	 that	 it	 receives	
additional,	 converging	 evidence	 from	 cognitive	 psychology.	 Specifi-
cally,	we	have	seen	that	social	concepts	associated	with	social	terms	
are	organized	essentialistically,	and	that	slurs	are	uniquely	associated	
with	negatively	valenced	stereotypes.	As	a	result,	my	semantic	theory	
converges	with	an	independently	plausible	research	program	on	the	
view	 that	 social	 concepts	 have	 essentialist	 structure,	 and	 is	 directly	
supported	by	experimental	research	on	slurring	words.
3.2 Nomen est Omen: The Important Role of Nouns 
If	 you	 go	 through	 a	 mental	 list	 of	 the	 slurs	 that	 you	 are	 familiar	
with,	you	will	probably	notice	 that	all	of	 them	belong	 to	 the	syntac-
tic	category	of	nouns.	This	 is	peculiar,	given	 that	most	of	slurs’	neu-
tral	 counterparts	 come	 in	both	nominal	 and	adjectival	 form	 (e.g.,	 ‘a	
homosexual’/‘homosexual’;	‘a	Jew’/‘Jewish’;	notice	also	prepositional	
constructions	such	as	‘someone	with homosexual	preferences’,	‘some-
one	from Mexico’,	etc.).	A	complete	linguistic	theory	of	slurs	should	be	
able	 to	explain	this	systematic	pattern,	and	not	 treat	 it	as	a	mere	ac-
cident.	Interestingly,	this	syntactic	inflexibility	of	slurs	is,	too,	directly	
predicted	by	the	essentialist	theory.	That	is,	in	contrast	to	other	avail-
able	theories,	the	essentialist	theory	is	not	only	compatible	with,	but	
and	Maass	used	a	semantic priming task. They	presented	participants	
subliminally	with	a	prime	word	that	was	either	a	neutral	term	(‘gay’),	
a	derogatory	counterpart	term	(‘fag’),	or	a	nonsense	term	(‘secadftg’).	
Hence,	 the	participants	never	 consciously	noticed	with	which	word	
they	were	primed.	This	 is	 important,	as	 it	eliminates	the	risk	of	task	
interventions	by	conscious	higher-level	pragmatic	processes.	Follow-
ing	the	prime,	the	participants	were	to	engage	in	a	lexical	decision	task.	
They	saw	a	target	word	that	was	either	a	trait	stereotypical	of	the	prime	
word	(e.g.,	 ‘elegant’	or	 ‘effeminate’),	counterstereotypical	(e.g.,	 ‘ener-
getic’	or	‘intolerant’),	or	completely	unrelated	(‘honest’	or	‘stingy’).	Im-
portantly,	half	of	the	traits	were	positively	valenced,	while	the	other	
half	of	the	target	words	was	negatively	valenced.	The	participants’	task	
was	to	make	a	lexical	word/nonword	decision	as	fast	as	possible.	The	
study	had	two	key	results.	First,	the	participants	reacted	significantly	
faster	to	stereotypical targets	than	to	counterstereotypical	or	unrelated	
targets,	 regardless of	 whether	 the	 prime	was	 neutral	 or	 derogatory.	
This	means	that	both	neutral	and	derogatory	category	representations	
immediately and automatically	 activate	 representations	 of	 the	 related	
stereotype	features.	Second,	the	authors	found	that	derogatory	labels	
were	again	significantly	less	likely	to	activate	flattering	associations	of	
the	social	group.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	derogatory	labels	resulted	in	the	
suppression	of	any	positively-valenced	stereotype,	giving	way	 for	 the	
negatively	valenced	associations	related	to	a	group.57
In	sum,	these	experiments	show	that	a)	slur	terms	encode	the	ste-
reotype	associated	with	a	social	group,58	and	that	b)	this	stereotype	dif-
fers	in	valence	from	the	stereotype	encoded	in	the	neutral	counterpart,	
of	intermixed	high	and	low-level	processes.	This	requirement	was	satisfied	in	
Carnaghi	and	Maass’	follow	up	study.
57.	 In	a	later	study	(Carnaghi	&	Maass,	2007),	the	authors	successfully	replicated	
the	results,	speaking	to	the	robustness	of	their	findings.
58.	Needless	to	say,	this	research,	together	with	the	abundant	amount	of	research	
on	typicality	effects	originating	in	Eleanor	Rosch’s	research	program	(Rosch,	
1988),	 supports	 that	 typicality	 effects	 are	 robust	 and	 thus	 relatively	 stable	
among	subjects.	Even	critics	of	prototype	theory	often	describe	this	stability	
as	the	most	attractive	feature	of	prototype	theory	(Fodor,	1998).
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2003,	p.	188).	In	short,	nouns	intuitively	(‘a	racist’,	‘a	schizophrenic’,	‘a	
blonde’,	‘a	liar’,	‘a	homerun	hitter’,	etc.)	impart	a	form	of	essentialism:	
The	property	that	is	nominalized	is	vital to	the	person’s	identity	and	al-
lows	for	a	variety	of	inductions.	Other	grammatical	forms,	such	as	ad-
jectives	and	verb	constructions	(‘have	schizophrenia’/’schizophrenic’,	
‘to	have	blond	hair’/’to	be	blond’,	etc.)	rather	convey	mutable,	tempo-
ral	qualities	of	an	individual.	
That	nouns	are	much	stronger	in	their	essentialist-communicative	
potential	than	other	word	forms	has	received	much	empirical	support.	
In	one	study,	Susan	Gelman	and	Gail	Heyman	compared	the	inductive	
potential	 children	 infer	 from	noun	and	verb	 labels	 (Gelman	&	Hey-
man,	 1999).	They	either	heard	a	 story	 that	contained	 “a	carrot	eater”	
(noun	phrase;	NP),	or	a	 story	 that	 talked	about	 someone	who	 “eats	
carrots	whenever	she	can”	(verb	phrase;	VP).	In	the	critical	part,	the	
children	 answered	 a	 set	 of	 questions	 that	 tested	 the	 stability	 of	 the	
properties:	e.g.,	“Will	Rose	eat	a	lot	of	carrots	when	she	is	grown	up?”	
or	“Would	Rose	eat	a	lot	of	carrots	if	she	grew	up	in	a	family	where	
no	one	liked	carrots?”	Children	in	the	NP	condition	predicted	signifi-
cantly	more	often	that	the	property	in	question	would	be	more	stable	
over	time	and	in	adverse	environmental	conditions	than	children	in	
the	VP	condition.	Thus,	the	grammatical	form	of	a	noun	seems	to	sug-
gest	to	a	child	that	a	category	is	to	be	thought	of	as	a	kind	(Gelman	&	
Heyman,	1999).
Carnaghi	et	al.	(2008)	replicated	and	developed	the	experiments	
initiated	 by	 Gelman	 and	 Heyman.	 In	 multiple	 experiments	 testing	
adults,	 they	 compared	 the	 inductive	 potential	 of	 nouns	 and	 adjec-
tives	which	assign	individuals	to	the	same	categories	(e.g.,	‘an	athlete’	
vs.	‘athletic’).	They	found	that	describing	a	person	by	a	noun	triggers	
significantly	more	stereotypical	inferences	as	compared	to	an	adjecti-
val	 description.	 Remarkably,	 nouns	 also	 inhibit	 inferences	 about	 be-
haviors	 or	 habits	 that	 are	 associatively	 rather	 incongruent	with	 the	
descriptors.	 For	 example,	 a	 person	 that	 is	 homosexual	 (adjective)	
was	 estimated	 to	 attend	 the	 church	more	 often	 than	 a	 homosexual	
(noun).	Moreover,	nouns	but	not	adjectives	inhibit the	possibility	of	
makes sense	 of	 the	 fact	 that	nouns	 are	 the	primary	 linguistic	 vehicle	
through	which	we	communicate	the	semantic	information	of	slurs.	
There	are	a	variety	of	different	linguistic	devices	by	means	of	which	
we	can	assign	an	individual	to	a	category.	Borrowing	an	example	from	
Wierzbicka	 (1986),	 consider	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 sentences	
“Anna	is	blond”	and	“Anna	is	a	blonde”.	In	both	cases,	we	predicate	a	
property	(blondness)	 to	Anna,	and	thereby	 include	her	 in	the	set	of	
things	that	instantiate	blondness.	But	although	the	set-theoretic	oper-
ations	of	both	predicates	are	prima facie	identical,	a	closer	look	reveals	
that	there	are	big	disparities	in	the	information	conveyed	by	the	adjec-
tive	and	the	noun.	Whereas	the	former	predicate	‘blond’	simply	refers	
to	a	quality	—	a	specific	hair	color	—	the	latter	predicate,	‘a	blonde’,	is	a	
sortal	that	refers	to	an	object,	or,	rather,	a	person	that	can	have	a	whole	
bunch	of	other	qualities.	Normally,	we	even	feel	compelled	to	make	a	
number	of	inferences	about	which	these	other	qualities	are	that	Anna,	
being	a	blonde,	has.	By	using	the	noun	rather	than	the	adjective,	the	
speaker	conveys	that	Anna	is	sexy	or	not	particularly	bright.
Another	example,	adopted	from	Gelman	(2003),	is	a	case	in	point.	
The	Atlanta	baseball	player	John	Rocker	was	criticized	for	making	a	
racist	comment	in	an	interview.	When	an	ABC	News	reporter	asked	
him	directly,	“Are	you	a	racist?”,	he	answered:	“Absolutely	not.	[…]	You	
hit	one	home	run	in	the	big	leagues,	it	doesn’t	make	you	a	home	run	
hitter.	[…]	To	make	one	[racist]	comment	like	this	doesn’t	make	you	
a	racist.”	Although	Rocker’s	argument	structure	seems	disputable	(to	
say	the	least),	it	does	tell	us	something	about	the	underlying	concep-
tual	difference	connected	to	a	noun	(‘a	homerun	hitter’,	‘a	racist’)	and	
a	verb	phrase	(‘to	hit	a	home	run’,	‘to	make	a	racist	comment’).	Impor-
tantly,	Rocker	himself	seems	to	take	for	granted	that	the	verbal	choice	
he	makes	directly	conveys	the	difference	in	meaning	between	‘to	hit	
a	home	run’	and	to	be	‘a	homerun	hitter’.	Whereas	the	first	choice	of	
syntactic	category	conveys	a	temporary	state	that	does	not	originate	in	
any	identifying	property	of	the	person,	the	latter	noun	form	implicates	
an	enduring,	 stable	 state	 that	 is	 central	 to	 the	person’s	 identity	 and	
reliably	causes	a	number	of	other	properties	of	 the	person	(Gelman,	
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white	people	invented	him,	then	you	have	to	find	out	why.	
And	the	future	of	the	country	depends	on	that.	Whether	
or	not	it	is	able	to	ask	that	question.	(Baldwin,	1963)59 
This	paper	was	an	attempt	 to	contribute	 to	 the	task	assigned	so	poi-
gnantly	by	Baldwin,	and	come	a	step	closer	to	an	answer	to	his	ques-
tion.	 I	have	argued	 that	 the	central	mechanism	of	 slurs	 is	one	of	es-
sentialization;	 slurs	are	akin	 to	kind	 terms	 that	denote	an	essence	of	
a	 social	 category	which	nomologically	 connects	 to	a	 set	of	negative	
stereotypical	features.	In	effect,	by	using	slurs,	or	even	having	them	in	
our	public	lexicon,	we	commit	to	a	way	of	carving	up	the	social	world	
that	 is	 dehumanizing	 and	gives	 groups	with	 the	dominant	 share	of	
social	power	a	tool	to	rationalize	and	maintain	the	oppressive	hierar-
chies	that	keep	down	marginalized	groups.	
To	illustrate	the	plausibility	of	the	essentialist	theory,	and	show	that	
it	does	interesting,	multi-layered	explanatory	work,	I	argued	that,	first,	
essentialism	 about	 slurs	 explains	 their	 recognized	 linguistic	 proper-
ties;	second,	that	the	essentialist	theory	receives	convergent	evidence	
from	cognitive	psychology;	and	third,	that	the	essentialist	theory	has	
unique	resources	to	explain	why	slurs	occur	predominantly	as	nouns.	
Importantly,	the	goal	of	this	paper	has	been	to	make	a	cumulative	case	
for	the	essentialist	theory	and	motivate	it	as	a	novel,	interesting	frame-
work	that	takes	seriously	the	challenge	of	linking	prejudiced,	hateful,	
or	bigoted	language	to	cognition	and	explains	its	relation	to	social	op-
pression.	Although	one	might	disagree	with	the	assessment	of	some	of	
the	data,	it	is	important	to	note	that	my	view	does	not	stand	or	fall	on	
the	basis	of	a	single	piece	of	evidence.	Good	theories	should	predict	
and	account	for	a	wide range of	data.	This	paper	shows	that	the	essen-
tialist	theory	does	precisely	that.
59.	Raoul	Peck’s	documentary	film	I Am Not Your Negro	is	a	collage	based	on	the	
unfinished	manuscripts	of	Remember this House,	immersed	with interview	ex-
cerpts	by	Baldwin	and	a	variety	of	other	material	(Peck,	2016).	The	final	scene	
the	quote	 is	 based	on	 is	 originally	 from	a	 1963	 interview	of	 Baldwin	with	
Kenneth	Clar.	Note	that	the	invention	of	the	‘nigger’	by	the	white	world	is	a	
re-occurring	theme	employed	by	Baldwin	(see,	e.g.,	Baldwin,	1963;	1969).
alternative	classifications	altogether	 (i.e.,	not	only	 incongruent	ones).	
Once	someone	is	categorized	as	belonging	to	one	social	category,	e.g.,	
‘artist’,	participants	are	not	very	willing	to	assign	them	to	a	second	one,	
e.g.,	 ‘athlete’.	These	results	did	not	hold	 for	adjective	conditions,	be-
cause	nouns	as	opposed	to	adjectives	tend	to	convey	discrete	category	
boundaries	which	do	not	intersect	with	other	categories.	Finally,	when	
Carnaghi	et	al.	primed	subjects	with	an	essentialist	scenario,	partici-
pants	would	even	themselves	be	more	likely	to	use	a	noun	to	describe	
a	person.	
In	sum,	nouns,	adjectives,	and	verb	phrases	do	not	only	categorize 
individuals,	 but	 also	 tell	 us	 something	 about	 the	 particular	way	 in	
which	the	individuals	are	categorized.	In	the	case	of	adjectives,	the	in-
dividual	is	assigned	to	one	qualitative	category	among	many	potential	
others.	In	the	case	of	nouns,	the	individual	is	assigned	to	one	category	
that	identifies	the	individual	in	question	in	a	rather	all-or-nothing	way	
and	allows	for	rich	inferences	with	regard	to	qualities	that	(allegedly)	
come	along	with	the	stable	category	in	question.	
At	this	point,	it	should	be	clear	why	my	essentialist	theory	explains	
that	nouns	are	 the	main	 syntactic	 vehicle	of	 slurs.	According	 to	my	
theory,	slurs	encode	essentialist	information.	We	have	now	seen	that	
nouns	are	 the	primary	 linguistic	device	we	use	 to	convey	 that	a	cat-
egory	is	essentialized.	So	if	the	semantics	of	slurs	is	essentialist,	nouns	
should be	the	primary	linguistic	vehicles	for	communicating	the	mean-
ing	of	 slurs.	Thus,	 the	essentialist	account	uniquely	predicts	and	ex-
plains	this	striking	syntactic	pattern	of	slurs.
Conclusion
In	 the	 closing	 scene	of	 I Am Not Your Negro,	 James	Baldwin	offers	 a	
powerful,	penetrating	diagnosis	of	White	America:
What	white	people	have	to	do,	is	try	to	find	out	in	their	
hearts	why	it	was	necessary	for	them	to	have	a	nigger	in	
the	first	place.	Because	 I	am	not	a	nigger.	 I’m	a	man.	 If	
I’m	not	the	nigger	here,	and	if	you	invented	him,	you	the	
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